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DEVELOPMENT OF THE DOCTRINE OF
ERIE RAILROAD V. TOMPKINS
C. SHERMAx DYE*
"The question for decision is whether the oft-challenged doctrine of
Swift v. Tyson" shall now be disapproved." Thus, Mr. Justice Brandeis,
in Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, 2 set the stage for one of the most far-
reaching decisions handed down by the Supreme Court in recent years-the
overruling of a decision which has been a center of controversy for nearly
a century.
- Stated concisely, the rejected doctrine was that in diversity of citizen-
ship cases the federal courts were not bound to follow the decisions of the
state courts as to matters of general jurisprudence. In the ease of Swift
v. Tyson the Court took it upon itself to construe Section 34 of the Judici-
ary Act of 1789,3 which read as follows:
"The laws of the several States, except where the Constitu-
tion, treaties, or statutes of the United States otherwise require
or provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in trials at
common law, in the courts of the United States, in cases where
they apply."
Mir. Justice Story, speaking for a majority of the court, interpreted the
word "laws" to include only statutory law and decisions as to matters
local in nature. As to matters of general law, the federal courts were,
Story said, free to exerci- c their own independent judgment.
The doctrine, though not without defenders, became the subject of
much bitter criticism both by occupants of the bench and by members of
the bar.4 Yet it persisted and, at the time when the Tompkins case arose,
*Third year student, Western Reserve Uni,;.,zity School of Law. A.B.,
Oberlin College, 1937.
1. 16 Pet. 1 (U. S. 1842).
2. 304 U. S. 64 (1938).
3. REv. STAT. § 721 (1875), 28 U. S. C. § 725 (1934), taken from the Act
of Sept. 24, 1789, c. 20, § 34, 1 STAT. 92.
4. Citations to the leading articles and comment both p-o and con are
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even its most bitter critics were of the opinion that it was too late for
judicial self-correction.5
Harry J. Tompkins, a citizen of Pennsylvania, while walking along
the Erie Railroad Company's right of way at IHughestown, Pennsylvania,
was severely injured by a passing train. He brought suit against the
railroad company, a New York corporation, in the District Court for the
Southern District of New York. Jurisdiction was based on diversity of
citizenship. The plaintiff maintained that he was on the premises as a
licensee. Defendant argued that Tompkins was a mere trespasser by
virtue of a Pennsylvania rule, as declared by its highest court. As so
often happened under the Swift v. Tyson doctrine, the disputed question
was whether the matter was one of local or general law. The district
court and the circuit court of appeals6 accepted the argument of the plain-
tiff, ignored the Pennsylvania rule, applied the general law, and held
the company liable. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.7
After elaboration of the doctrine of Swift v. Tyson and its history,
Mr. Justice Brandeis, speaking for the majority of the court, concluded:
"Third. Except in matters governed by the Federal Con-
stitution or by Acts of Congress, the law to be applied in any
case is the law of the State. And whether the law of the State
shall be declared by its Legislature in a statute or by its highest
court in a decision is not a matter of federal concern. There is
no federal general common law. Congress has no power to
declare substantive rules of common law applicable in a State
whether they be local in their nature or "general", be they com-
mercial law or a part of the law of torts. And no clause in the
Constitution purports to confer such a power upon the federal
courts. "s
The case was remanded to the circuit court of appeals for proceed-
5. Professor Dobie of the University of Virginia alone seems to have
forecast the overrulings in his article Seven Implications of Swift v. Tyson(1930) 16 Va. L. REv. 225. On the other hand, such authorities as' Mr. Justice
Frankfurter, then professor at Harvard Law School, were convinced that the
court would not overrule its earlier decisions. Frankfurter, Distribution of
Judicial Power Between Federal and State Courts (1928) 13 CORN. L. Q. 499.
See also the dissenting opinions of Mr. Justice Holmes in Kuhn v. Fairmont Coal
Co., 215 U. S. 349, 371 (1910), and Black & White Taxicab Co. v. Brown &
Yellow Taxicab Co., 276 U. S. 518, 535 (1928).
6. Tompkins v. Erie R. R., 90 F. (2d) 603 (C. C. A. 2d, 1937). Neither
party to the case argued the validity of the doctrine of Swift v. Tyson but
rather argued as to its applicability. Yet the Court, as suggested by the above
quotation, treated the case as though that were the sole issue.
7. Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, 302 U. S. 671 (1937).
8. Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64, 78 (1937).
[Vol. 5
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ings consistent with the opinion. Applying Pennsylvania law the court
absolved the company of liability because Tompkins was a trespasser.9
The theoretical problem underlying these decisions is one which
arises out of our federal system of government under which two sets of
partially co-ordinate courts exist. Since state courts base jurisdic.tion
largely upon the presence of the parties within the state's boundaries,
the jurisdiction of federal courts over certain persons, without regard to
the nature of the dispute, results in an overlapping of the jurisdictions of
state and federal courts. Thus, in each of forty-eight geographical areas
there are two systems of courts deciding the same questions of law.
One problem raised by this situation is that of policy in determining
whether the two kinds of courts shall decide the questions in the same
manner. It was hoped that the Swift v. Tyson doctrine of permitting
the federal courts to exercise an independent judgment would promote
uniformity of decision in the state courts because of an expected tendency
on the part of the latter to follow the federal rules. The decision did not
promote uniformity in the way that it was expected. Instead it often re-
suilted in the development of two sets of rules within a single area. To
quote Mr. Justice Brandeis:
"It made rights enjoyed under the unwritten 'general law'
vary according to whether enforcement was sought in the state
or in the federal court; and the privilege of selecting the court
in which the right should be determined was conferred upon the
non-citizen.' 0 Thus, the doctrine rendered impossible equal pro-
tection of the law. In attempting to promote uniformity of law
throughout the United States, the doctrine had prevented uni-
formity in the admini'tration of the law of the State."',
The Tompkins case r presents a reversal of policy on the fundamental
problem arising from our dual system of courts.'12  Its policy is to create
9. Tompkins v. Erie R. R., 98 F. (2d) 49 (C. C. A. 2d, 1938). Rehear-
ing was denied by the Supreme Court, 305 U. S. 637 (,938).
10. This statement is not entirely true since a resident as wel as a non-
resident may have original access to the federal courts. H.);ever, once the action
has started in a state court only the non-resident defendant may remove it
to a federal court. Act of May 14, 1934, c. 283, § 1, 48 STAT. 775, Act of Aug.
21, 1937, c. 726, § 1, 50 STAT. 738, 28 U. S. C. § 41 (-1934).
11. Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64, 74 (1937).
12. Mr. Justice Brandeis in the majority opinion bases this change of
policy on constitutional grounds. There has been so much comment on the
problems raised by this determination that it is unnecessary to discuss it at
this time. Mr. Justice Butler in a dissenting opinion, in which he was joined
by Mr. Justice McReynolds, criticised this basis for the decision. Mr. Justice
Reed concurred in the result but not in the portion of the opinion which based
3
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conformity within each of the states. The method adopted is to have the
federal court yield to the state court.
The practical significance of the change of doctrine is illustrated by
the fact that different results were reached at the two hearings before the
circuit court of appeals of the Tompkins case. This is an example of
what can be expected in all of the many fields to which Swift v. Tyson had
been expanded and in the fields to which the Tompkins case may be ex-
panded in the future. The entire body of "general laws" which had been
built up in the federal courts since 1842 has now been discarded. It will
be years before all of the effects can be determined, but there has already
been a sufficient number of cases decided on the basis of the Tompkins
case ito give some indication of the course which future developments may
take. The analysis here undertaken will include those decisions of the
Supreme Court and other federal courts reported prior to February 1,
1940, which have explicitly relied on the Tompkins decision.
The most far-reaching expansion of Erie Railroad v. Tompkins came
the week following that decision when the Supreme Court held it to be
applicable in equitable, as well as legal, actions.1" The New York Life
the decision on constitutional grounds. For further discussion of the' decision
as to the constitutionality issue and other issues as well see: Bowman, The
Unconstitutionality of the Rule of Swift v. Tyson (1938) 18 B. U. L. REV. 659;
Jackson, The Rise and Fall of Swift v. Tyson (1938) 24 A. B. A. J. 609; Grant,
The Search for Uniformity of Law (1938) 32 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 1082; Long,
A Warning Signal For Municipal Bond Holders: Some Implications of Erie
Railroad v. Tompkins (1939) 37 MICH. L. REv. 589; McCormick & Hewins,
The Collapse of "General Law" in the Federal Courts (1938) 33 ILL. L. REV.
126; Miller, Swift v. Tyson and Some Considerations of Philosophy in American
Law (1939) 11 Miss. L. J. 243; Rooks, Effect of the United States Supreme
Court Decision in Erie Railroad v. Tompkins (1938) 9 Mo. BAR J. 108; Schweppe,
What Has Happened to Federal Jurisprudence? (1938) 24 A. B. A. J. 421;
Stimson, Swift v. Tyson-What Remains? (1938) 24 CORN. L. Q. 54, (1939) 7 J.
KAN. BA:i ASSN. 242, (1939) 62 N. J. L. J. 93; Shulman, The Demise of Swift
v. Tyson (1938) 47 YALE L. J. 1336; Tunks, Categorization and Federalism:
"Substance" and "Procedure" After Erie Railroad v. Tompkins (1939) 34 ILL.
L. REV. 271.
Notes (1938) 38 COL. L. REv. 1472, (1939) 52 HARV. L. REv. 1002, (1938)
36 Mici*. L. REV. 1312, (1939) 37 MICH. L. REV. 1249, (1938) 22 MINN. L. REV.
885, (1939) 18 NEB. L. REv. 59, (1939) 13 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 71, (1938) 12
TEMP. L. Q. 486, (1938) 24 VA. L. REV. 895, (1938) 3 FED. BAR ASSN. J. 217,
(1938) 7 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 257, (1938) 16 N. Y. U. L. Q. REV. 144, (1938) 86
U. OF PA. L. REV. 896, (1938) 11 So. CALIF. L. REV. 498, 511, (1938) 23 WASH.
U. L. Q. 568.
13. Ruhlin v. New York Life Ins. Co., 304 U. S. 202 (1938). Two weeks
later the Supreme Court twice reaffirmed the expansion of the doctrine of
the Tompkins case to actions in equity and held that interpretation should have
been in accordance with state court decisions. Each case involved an attemut
to cancel the reinstatement of an insurance policy. Jurisdiction was based upon
diversity of citizenship in all three cases, Rosenthal v. New York Life Ins.
Co., 304 U. S. 263 (1938) ; New York Life Ins. Co. v. Jackson, 304 U. S. 261 (1938).
[Vol. 5
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Insurance Co. brought an action in equity to rescind the permanent dis-
ability and double indemnity provisions of the defendant's life insurance
policy on the ground that they were obtained by fraud. The precise
question involved -was a construction of the incontestability clause of the
insurance contract. Air. Justice Reed delivered the opinion of the court,
pointing out that:
"The doctrine [of the Tompkins case] applies though the
question of construction arises not in an action of law, but in a
suit in equity. Compare Mason v. United States, 260 U. S. 545,
557, 558.'11
This wording covers only the question of legal principles applicable in an
equitable action.'" It is to be noted that the principles involved were in
essence legal, i.e., questions of contract law in the interpretation of the
insurance policies. Therefore, the holding left open the question whether
the Tompkins case would be expanded to include the application of state
principles of equity jurisprudence. Doubt was dispelled, however, by the
Supreme Court in Wichita Royalty Co. v. City National Bank.'6 Although
the action itself was legal, a suit on a promissory note with counterclaim
for participation in breach of trust, the principles applied were essential-
ly equitable. The questions onl which Texas decisions were held applicable
involved trust doctrines.' 7
Other types of purely equitable problems in which local rules have been
14. Ruhlin v. N. Y. Life Ins. Co., 304 U. S. 202, 205 (1938). In Mason v.
United States, 260 U. S. 545 (1923), it was stated that in purely local matters
state equitable principles should govern.
15. A number of writers have expressed doubts as to the extent of this
decision. Bowman, supra note 12, at 879, n. 51, McCormick and Hewins, supra
note 12, at 140, n. 62, Schweppe, supra note 12, at 421 et seq. Cf. Tunks, supra note
12, at 284.
The discussion at this point involves the whole question of whether there is
any substantive body of equity rules or whether equity is merely procedural
and remedial. The discussion here goes on the assumption that there are sub-
stantive rules of equity as well as rules of equitable jurisdiction and procedure.
Such an assumption seems quite justifiable in light of the fact that under the
new Federal Rules (Rules of Civil Procedure for the District Courts of the
United States, Rule 2) equity has become almost entirely a matter of substance
determining the relief to be had on a given set of facts. Cf. Cook, The Place of
Equity in Our Legal System (1912) 3 AM. LAW SCHOOL REV. 173, and discus-
sion by Schofield, id. 178; Hohfeld, The Relation Between Equity and Law (1913)
11 MICH. L. REV. 537, and supplemental note (1917) 26 YAIE L. J. 767.
16. 306 U. S. 103 (1939). In reaching the conclusion that the equity prob-
lem has not been decided, Tunks, supra note 12, apparently overlooks this case.
17. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Catskill National Bank & Trust Co.,
102 F. (2d) 527 (C. C. A. 2d, 1939), involves a similar problem, i.e., the stand-
ard of care to be exercised by a depositary of trust funds.
5
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held applicable"5 have involved: determination of whether a certain clause
in a trust instrument was void as against public policy;"O attempts to
have the court declare the existence of a constructive trust ;2' and an at-
tempt to force specific performance by a holding company of a eontract
to purchase stock of a subsidiary.2 1
As a result of the above cases the rule of the Tompkins case can be said
to appLy to actions either in law or in equity,22 and no further attempt will
be made to distinguish in this discussion between legal and equitable ac-
tions.
A large number of the diversity cases, wherein there has been little
hesitancy in applying the Tompkins case, have involved questions of in-
surance law.23 Even before the Tompkins case the Supreme Court had
18. Cf. Baltimore Trust Co. v. Interocean Oil Co., 29 F. Supp. 269 (D. Md.
1939).
19. Jenkins v. First National Bank, 26 F. Supp. 312 (N. D. Tex. 1939).
20. Bruun v. Hanson, 103 F. (2d) 685 (C. C. A. 9th, 1939); Reno National
Bank v. Seaborn, 99- F. (2d) 482 (C. C. A. 9th, 1938).
21. Murphy v. North American Light & Power Co., 24 F. Supp. 471 (S.
D. N. Y. 1938).
22. In applying the Tompkins case to cases in equity the federal courts
will undoubtedly continue to be subject to the constitutional limitations set
forth in such cases as Scott v. Neely, 140 U. S. 106 (1891); Cates v. Allen, 149
U. S. 451 (1893); Whitehead v. Shattuck, 138 U. S. 146 (1891); Mississippi
Mills v. Cohn, 150 U. S. 202 (1893); Guffey v. Smith, 237 U. S. 101 (1915);
Pusey & Jones Co. v. Hanssen, 261 U. S. 491 (1923); Henrietta Mills v.
Rutherford County, 281 U. S. 121 (1930). Under the Tompkins case the same
problems will probably now arise as to state decisions which arose in the above
cases as to state statutes. The effect on these problems of the union of law
and equity under the new Federal Rules is, of course, as yet undetermined.
In Hollingsworth v. General Petroleum Corp., 26 F. Supp. 917 (D. Ore.
1939), it was held that in applying the Seventh Amendment federal courts are
not bound by state decisions as to what constitute equitable defense.
23. New York Life Ins. Co. v. Ruhlin, 25 F. Supp. 65 (W. D. Pa. 1938),
106 F. (2d) 921 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1939) (effeet of incontestability clause) ; Rosen-
thal v. New York Life Ins. Co., 99 F. (2d) 578 (C. C. A. 8th, 1938) (effect of
incontestability clause, also whether insurance company barred by laches or
waiver); New York Life Ins. Co. v. Jackson, 98 F. (2d) 950 (C. C. A. 7,h, 1938)
(ambiguities in policy construed); Ostroff v. New York Life Ins. C , 23 F.
Supp. 724 (S. D. Calif. 1938), rev'd, 104 F. (2d) 986 (C. C. A. 9th, 19"39), cert.
denied, 60 Sup. Ct. 122 (U. S. 1939) (interpretation of incontestability clause);
Malloy v. New York Life Ins. Co., 103 F. (2d) 439 (C. C. A. 1st, 1939) (inter-
pretation of incontestability clause); New York Life Ins. Co. v. Waterman,
104 F. (2d) 990 (C. C. A. 9th, 1939) (interpretation of incontestability clause);
Bowie v. Bankers Life Co., 105 F. (2d) 806 (C. C. A. 10th, 1939) (reinstate-
ment); Profit v. Seaboard Mutual Casualty Co., 28 F. Supp. 202 (D. Md. 1939)
(cancellation); American National Ins. Co. v. Belch, 100 F. (2d) 48 (C. C. A.
4th, 1938) (death by accidental means); Pope v. Lincoln National Life Ins.
Co., 103 F. (2d) 265 (C. C. A. 8th, 1939) (death by accidental means) ; Denton v.
T-ravelers Ins. Co., 25 F. Supp. 556 (D. Md. 1938) (death by accidental means);
Mangol v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 103 F. (2d) 14 (C. C. A. 7th, 1939)
(whether death within exception to accident policy); Jones v. New York Casual-
ty Co., 23 F. Supp. 932 (E. D. Va. 1938) (additional insured under automobile
policy); Preferred Accident Ins. Co. v. Barker, 104 F. (2d) 424 (C. C. A. 6th,
[ Vol. .5
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decided in Mutual Iiisurance Co. v. Johnson, Adm'r.,24 to follow the ruling
of the Virginia court since there was no general principle of the law of
contracts of insurance involved. The problem was one of construction of
a condition in the policy sued upon. Many of the cases decided since the
Tompkins case have presented problems no broader than that decided in
the Johnson case. In the Johnson case, however, the court indicated that
its determination to follow state law was based on expediency rather than
on the absence of power to exercise an independent judgment. The
Tompkins case and those following it go a step further and say that federal
courts are without power to exercise an independent judgment in the
interpretation of contracts of insurance and in the determination of ap-
plicable principles of insurance law.
1939) (additional insured); Shanks v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 25 F. Supp. 740 (N.
D. Okla. 1938) (time of expiration of group policy); Penn Mutual Life Ins.
Co. v. Forcier, 103 F. (2d) 166 (C. C. A. 8th, 1939) (expiration of contract
of insurance); McGogney v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 103 F. (2d) 649 (C. C. A.
3rd, 1939) (lapse of policy); Dorman v. John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co.,
25 F. Supp. 889 (S. D. Calif. 1939) (status of director as employee under group
policy); North American Accident Ins. Co. v. Anderson, 100 F. (2d) 452 (C. C.
A. 10th, 1938) (more hazardous occupation); Mutual Benefit, Health and
Accident Ass'n v. Bowman, 304 U. S. 549 (1938), 99 F. (2d) 856 (C. C. A.
8th, 1938) ("participating in aeronautics"); Myers v. Ocean Accident and
Guaranty Corp., 99 F. (2d) 485 (C. C. A. 4th, 1938) (persons being carried
for hire); Jensen v. Canadian Indemnity Co., 98 F. (2d) 469 (C. C. A. 9th, 1938)
(carrying passengers for compensation); Turner v. New York Life Ins. Co.,
100 F. (2d) 193 (C. C. A. 8th, 1938) (payment of premium); Lyon v. Mutual
Benefit, Health and Accident Ass'n, 305 U. S. 484 (1939) (payment in advance);
State Mutual Life Assur. Co. v. Briscoe, 107 F. (2d) 977 (C. C. A. 6th, 1939)
(failure to pay premiums); rox v. Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co., 107 F. (2d)
715 (C. C. A. 8th, 1939) (failure to pay premiums, forfeiture); New England
Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Spe ice, 25 F. Supp. 633 (W. D. N. Y. 1938), rev'd, 104
F. (2d) 665 (C. C. A. 2d, 1939) (status, as beneficiary, of divorced wife);
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Richardson, 27 F. Supp. 791 (W. D. La. 1939)
(divorced wife); Toomey v. Toomey, 98 F. (2d) 736 (C. C. A. 7th, 1938) (rights
as beneficiaries); Fireman's Fund Indemnity Co. v. Kennedy, 97 F. (2d) 882
(C. C. A. 9th, 1938) (notice to insurer); Fidelity & Guaranty Fire Corp. v.
Bilquist, 99 F. (2d) 333 (C. C. A. 9th, 1938) (estoppel to set up breach of
warranty); Manufacturers Casualty Ins. Co. v. Roach, 25 F. Supp. 852 (D. Md.
1939) (waiver); Traveler's Indemnity Co. v. Plymouth Box & Panel Co., 99
F. (2d) 218 (C. C. A. 4th, 1938) (amount of damages); Colorado Life Co. v.
Steele, 101 F. (2d) 448 (C. C. A. 8th, 1939) (total disability); Aetna Life Ins.
Co. v. Conway, 102 F. (2d) 743 (C. C. A. 10th, 1939) (double indemnity clause);
Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Young, 103 F. (2d) 839 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1939) (double
indemnity, predisposing causes); Paddleford v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 100 F.
(2d) 606 (C. C. A. 7th, 1939) (exception to liability of insurance company);
New York Life Ins. Co. v. McCurdy, 106 F. (2d) 181 (C. C. A. 10th, 1939)(false statements in application); Guardian Life Ins. Co. v. Clum, 106 F. (2d)
592 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1939) (false statements in application); Pacific Indemnity
Co. v. McDonald, 107 F. (2d) 446 (C. C. A. 9th, 1939) (false statements fol-
lowing accident); Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Logan Grain Co., 105 F. (2d) 699
(C. C. A. 8th, 1939) (forfeiture clause fire policy).
24. 293 U. S. 335 (1934).
7
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Erie Railroad v. Tompkins was itself a tort case. Therefore, there
has been no doubt but that it applies in tort cases.25 The courts have ex-
perienced little difficulty in determining that they should be disposed of
in accordance with state decisions. The rule has likewise been adhered to
25. Tompkins v. Erie R. R., 98 F. (2d) 49 (C. C. A. 2d, 1938); Ells v.
Scandrett, 28 F. Supp. 16 (D. Idaho 1938) (children playing on track); Dela-
ware & H. R. R. v. Bonzik, 105 F. (2d) 341 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1939) (boys riding
train); Chicago, G. W. R. R. v. Robinson, 101 F. (2d) 994 (C. C. A. 8th, 1939)
(rights of pedestrian crossing railroad tracks) ; Bash v. Baltimore & Ohio R. R.,
102 F. (2d) 48 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1939) (grade crossing accident); Thomson v.
Stevens, 106 F. (2d) 739 (C. C. A. 8th, 1939) (grade crossing accident); Gaede
v. Union Pacific R. R., 28 F. Supp. 396 (D. Colo. 1939) (grade crossing accident,
imputed contributory negligence); Moore v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. R., 28 F. Supp.
804 (W. D. Mo. 1939) (grade crossing accident); Zentz v. Buchman, 103 F.
(2d) 850 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1938) (auto accident); Demers v. Railway Express
Agency, 108 F. (2d) 107 (C. C. A. 1st, 1939) (children playing around truck);
Baskin v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 104 F. (2d) 531 (C. C. A. 4th, 1939)(negligence); Taylor v. McCowat-Mercer Printing Co., 27 F. Supp. 880 (W.
D. Pa. 1939) (negligence, licensee, invitee); Krier v. Muschel, 29 F. Supp.
482 (S. D. N. Y. 1939) (negligence); Hudson v. Moonier, 304 U. S. 397 (1938)
(operation of a truck with improper equipment); Egan Chevrolet Co. v. Bruner,
102 F. (2d) 373 (C. C. A. 8th, 1939) (sale of truck with defective steering
equipment); Harris v. Traglio, 24 F. Supp. 402 (D. Ore. 1938), aff'd, 104 F.
(2d) 439, (C. C. A. 9th, 1939- (refuse-to impute contributory negligence of
husband to wife); Luhman v. Hoover, 100 F. (2d) 127 (C. C. A. 6th, 1938)(boy injured by dynamite caps negligently kept); Kansas Gas & Electric Co.
v. Evans, 100 F. (2d) 549 (C. C. A. 10th, 1938) (standard of care); Wunderlich
v. Franklin, 100 F. (M. 164 (C. C. A. 5th, 1938) (wanton negligence); Coca-
Cola Bottling Co. v. Munn, 99 F. (2d) 190 (C. C. A. 4th, 1938) (deleterious sub-
stance in bottled beverage); Bissonette v. National Biscuit Co., -100 F. (2d)
1003 (C. C. A. 2d, 1939) (bread contained glass); DeLape v. Liggett &
Meyers Tobacco Co., 25 F. Supp. 1006 (S. D. Calif. 1939) (defective cigarette) ;
Hagan & Cushing Co. v. Washington Water Power Co., 99 F. (2d) 614 (C. C.
A. 9th, 1938) (effect of intervening cause on doctrince of res ipsa losuitur);
Kelly v. Duke Power Co., 97 F. (2d) 529 (C. C. A. 4th, 1938) (contributory
negligence as a matter of law); Boal v. Electric Storage Battery Co., 98
F. (2d) 815 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1938) (industrial disease); Maty v. Grasselli
Chemical Co., 98 F. (2d) 877 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1938) (industrial disease); Allison
v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 99 F. (2d) 507 (C. C. A. 4th, 1938) (rights
and duties in employer-employee relationship); Brabham v. Mississippi, 97 F.(2d) 251 (C. C. A. 5th, 1938), cert. denied, 305 U. S. 636 (1938) (punitive
damages); White v. Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Co., 24 F. Supp. 871 (D.
Ore. 1938), aff'd, 104 F. (2d) 923 (C. C. A. 9th, 1939) (liability of corpora-
tion for punitive damages for assault and battery); Schopp v. Muller Dairies,
25 F. Supp. 50 (E. D. N. Y. 1938) (burden of proving freedom from contribu-
tory negligence); Francis v. Humphrey, 25 F. Supp. 1 (E. D. Ill. 1938) (burden
of alleging and proving freedom from contributory negligence); Sunkist
Drinks, Inc. v. California Fruit Growers Exchange, 25 F. Supp. 400 (S. D. N.
Y. 1938) (malicious prosecution); American Optometric Ass'n v. Ritholz, 101
F. (2d) 883 (C. C. A. 7th, 1939) (may damages be recovered in suit to enjoin
malicious prosecutions); Interstate Transit Lines v. Crane, 100 F. (2d) 857 (C.
C. A. 10th, 1938) (malice necessary to overcome privilege in suit for libel);
Brennan v. Lumbermen's Mutual Casualty Co., 26 F. Supp. 305 (D. Mass. 1938)
(slander); Mau v. Rio Grande Oil, 28 F. Supp. 845 (N. D. Calif. 1939) (right
of privacy); Norfolk & Western Ry. v. Riggs, Riggs v. Norfolk & Western Ry.,
98 F. (2d) 612 (C. C. A. 6th, 1938) (comparative negligence doctrine); De-
slauriers Steel Mould Co. v. Gangaway, 97 F. (2d) 78 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1938)
(contribution among joint tort-feasors); Marcus v. Hinck, 28 F. Supp. 945 (S. D.
N. Y. 1939) (release of joint tort-feasor); Tulsa City Lines v. Mains, 107 F.
(2d) 377 (C. C. A. 10th, 1939) (validity of release); cf. Albert Miller & Co. v.
Corte, 107 F. (2d) 432 (C. C. A. 5th, 1939) (libel).
(Vol. 5
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in cases involving the law of contracts,", agency,27 and other fields of
general substantive law,28 and evidence. 21
26. Cream of Wheat Corp. v. Moundridge Milling Co., 24 F. Supp. 998
(D. Kan. 1938), rev'd by reason of change in state law, 105 F. (2d) 366 (C. C.
A. 10th, 1939) (contract for purchase of wheat); General Petroleum Corp.
v. Seaboard Terminals Corp., 23 F. Supp. 137 (D. Md. 1938) (sealed instrument);
Dunham v. Omaha & C. B. St. Ry., 25 F. Supp. 287 (S. D. N. Y. 1938), rev'd on
application of state law, 106 F. (2d) 1 (C. C. A. 2d, 1939) (whether bond
holder limited to remedy under mortgage); Oxnard Theatres v. Paramount
Pictures, 24 F. Supp. 44 (S. D. Calif. 1938) (fraud in formation of the con-
tract); Rachlin v. Libby-Owens-Ford Glass Co., 96 F. (2d) 597 (C. C. A. 2d,
1938) (breach of warranty); Texarkana v. Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co., 306
U. S. 188 (1939) (franchise contract); Gray & Co. v. Western Borax Co., 99
F. (2d) 239 (C. C. A. 9th, 1938) (anticipatory breach, exclusive agency);
Williams v. Mutual Benefit, Health and Accident Ass'n, 100 F. (2d) 264 (C. C.
A. 5th, 1938) (anticipatory breach); Panama City v. Federal Reserve Bank, 97
F. (2d) 499 (C. C. A. 5th, 1938) (set-off); Wunderlich v. National Surety
Co., 24 F. Supp. 640 (D. Minn. 1938) (accord and satisfaction); Reconstruc-
tion Finance Corp. v. Maryland Casualty Co., 23 F. Supp. 1008 (D. Md. 1938)
(subrogation); Turner v. New York Life Ins. Co., 100 F. (2d) 193 (C. C. A.
8th, 1938) (payment); Murphy v. North American Light & Power Co., 24
F. Supp. 471 (S. D. N. Y. 1938) (specific performance of a contract to pur-
chase stock); Carter Oil Co. v. Mitchell, 100 F. (2d) 945 (C. C. A. 10th, 1939)
(implied covenant to reasonably develop oil lease); American Brake Shoe &
Foundry Co. v. Interborough Rapid Transit Co., 26 F. Supp. 954 (S. D. N. Y.
1939) (validity of agreement to pay interest on overdue coupons of notes);
First National Bank v. Mayor and City Counsel, 27 F. Supp. 444 (D. Md. 1939)
(negotiability, assignment); Women's Catholic Order of Foresters v. Special
School District of North Little Rock, 105 F. (2d) 716 (C. C. A. 8th, 1939)
(interpretation); Cf. Coos Bay Lumber Co. v. Collier, 104 F. (2d) 722 (C. C. A.
9th, 1939) (accord and satisfaction).
27. Dismang v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 24 F. Supp. 782 (N. D.
Okla. 1938), rev'd on other grounds, 106 F. (2d) 362 (C. C. A. 10th, 1939) (pre-
sumption of agency, suit against corporation based on tort of servant); Gray,
McFawn & Co. v. Hegarty, Conroy & Co., 27 F. Supp. 93 (S. D. N. Y. 1939)
(joint venture); see dissent Federal Reserve Bank v. Algar, 100 F. (2d) 941,
942 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1938, on reargument Jan. 6, 1939) (agency to collect notes).
28. Washington Water Power Co. v. Couer D'Alene, 25 F. Supp. 795
(D. Idaho 1938) (power of municipal corporation to make contract); Keifer
& Keifer v. Reconstruction Finance Corp., 97 F. (2d) 812 (C. C. A. 8th, 1938)
(ability of bailee to contrau. out of liability for negligence) ; Panko v. Endicott
Johnson Corp., 24 F. Supp. 78 (N. D. N. Y. 1938) (ability to sue); United States
v. Durrance, 101 F. (2d) 109 (C. C. A. 5th, 1939) (ability to sue for wrongful
death); Iser v. Brockway, 25 F. Supp. 221 (W. D. Pa. 1938) (validity of service
of summons); Hack v. American Surety Co., 96 P. (2d) 939 (C. C. A. 7th,
1938), cert. denied, 305 U. S. 631 (1938), rehearing denied, 305 U. S. 671 (1938)
(liability on surety bond); Alford v. McConnell, 27 F. Supp. 176 (N. D. Okla.
1939) (liability on sheriff's official bond); Missouri ex rel. Devault v. Fidelity &
Casualty Co., 107 F. (2d) 343 (C. C. A. 8th, 1939) (sheriff's bond) ; First Na-
tional Bank v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 105 F. 12d) 339 (C. C. A. 3rd,
1939) (representations in application for surety bond) : Kravas v. Great Atlantic
& Pacific Tea Co., 28 F. Supp. 66 (W. D. Pa. !93V.) (indirnnty awd contribu-
tion); National Automatic Tool Co. v. Goldie, 27 F. Supp. 399 (D. Minn. 1939)(right to garnishment); Kleinschmidt v. Brown, 28 F. Supp. 86 (E. D. Ark.
1939) (fixtures); Matthews v. Barker, 30 F. Supp. 464 (D. Idaho 1938) (prop-
erty rights); Bailey v. Porter-Wadley Lumber Co., 28 F. Supp. 25 (W. D. La.
1939) (property rights); Pruitt v. Porter-Wadley Lumber Co., 28 F. Supp.
31 (W. D. La. 1939) (property rights); Carr v. United States, 28 F. Supp. 236
(W. D. Ky. 1939) (measure of damages); Lincoln Mines Operating Co. v. Hur-
on Holding Corp., 27 F. Supp. 720 (D. Idaho 1939) (right to attachment);
contra: New Port Richey v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 105 F. (2d) 348 (C. C. A.
5th, 1939) (negotiable instruments). This last case seems clearly wrong.
29. Lyon v. Mutual Benefit, Health & Accident Ass'n, 305 U. S. 484 (1939); 9
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Conflict of laws is among those fields of general substantive law in
which the Tompkins case would seem applicable.30 If, as is stated by Mr.
Justice Brandeis, "There is no federal general common law," there can
be no federal common law rules of conflict of laws, and state rules must
determine what state law should govern. " ' The problem is not, however,
as simple as it might seem. The suggestion has been made3" of a possible
interpretation of Section 34 of the Judiciary Act which would place em-
phasis on the last words of the section: "in cases where they apply."
Such emphasis, it has been suggested, would permit the federal courts to
make their own choice as to when the laws of a particular state should
apply. 3 It has also been suggested that even without such emphasis the
federal courts might as a matter of policy make their own selection of
state law.
3 4
Boal v. Electric Storage Battery Co., 98 F. (2d) .815 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1938)(standard of proof applied); Allison v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 99
F. (2d) 507 (C. C. A. 4th, 1938) (res ipsa loquitur); Coca-Cola Bottling Co.
v. -unn, 99 F. (2d) 190 (C. C. A. 4th, 1938) (res ipsa loquitur; admissibility
of avidenca o injury to- other- people) ; Rosenthal v. New York Life Ins. Co., 99
F: (2d) 578 (C. C. A. 8th, 1938) (opinion evidence); Pollard v. Nicholls, 99
F. (2d) 955 (C. C. A. 5th, 1938) (non-expert testimony); Chicago, G. W. R. R.
v. Robinson, 101 F. (2d) 994 (C. C. A. 8th, 1939) (admissibility of photographs);
Norfolk & W. Ry. v- Riggs, 99 F. (2d) 612 (C. C. A. 6th, 1938) (ability of
members of jury to impeach verdict); Equitable Life Assur. Soc. v. MacDonald,
96 F. (2d) 437 (C. C. A. 9th, 1938), cert. denied, 305 U. S. 624 (1938) (presump-
tion, burden of proof); Dismang v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 24 F. Supp.
7.82. (N. D. Okla. 1938) (presumption); Chinn v. Llangollen Stables, 25 F.
Supp. 389 (E. D. Ky. 1938) (parol evidence); see also Phillips v. Davidson,
24 F. Supp. 184, 185, 186 (E. D. S. C. 1938) (parol evidence); Hagan & Cushing
Co. v. Washington Water Power Co., 99 F. (2d) 614, 616 (C. C. A. 9th, 1938)
(res ipsa loquitur); cf. Egan Chevrolet Co. v. Bruner, 102 F. (2d) 373 (C. C.
A. 8th, 1939); Cities Service Oil Co. v. Dunlap, 101 F. (2d) 314 (C. C. A. 5th,
1939); Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Conway, 102 F. (2d) 743 (C. C. A. 10th, 1939).
For a discussion of these cases as raising a problem in substance and procedure
see infra p. 25.
30. Aside from problems as to what is substantive and what is procedural
or remedial in conflicts of laws, the question might be raised as to whether or
not the whole question of choice of law is substantive. See Cook, "Sl.ostance"
and "Procedure" in the Conflict of Laws (1933) 42 YALE L. J. 333.
31. Note, Is There a Federal Law of Conflict of Laws? (1939) 24 IOWA L.
REv. 784. There is, of course, the as yet vague field of federal constitutional
limitations on conflict of laws rules. For recent discussions of this problem
see Smith, The Constitution and Conflict of Laws (1939) 27 GEo. L. J. 536;
Hilpert & Cooley, The Federal Constitution and the Choice of Law (1939) 25
WASH. U. L. Q. 27.
32. Note, Congress, the Tompkins Case, and the Conflict of Laws (1939) 52
HAR V. L. REv. 1002.
33. The last phrase probably was intended merely to mean that if there were
any state law which might apply to the facts of the case it should be applied.
The interpretation suggested is, however, a possible one, but it would be a
considerable narrowing of the broad wording with which Mr. Justice Brandeis
announces the constitutional basis of the Tompkins decision. As yet there is
no basis in case law for saying that it will be so narrowed.
34. This interpretation seems inconsistent with the spirit of the Tompkins
case since it might lead to the same discrimination between residents and non-
residents which existed under Swift v. Tyson.
(Vol. 5
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Tle Supreme Court in Rulin v. New York Life Insurance Co., rec-
ognized the problem, but refused to comnient on it." In the lower federal
courts it has arisen several time.,; and ditferent results have been reached.
Some courts have felt theniselve-s bound by state conflict of laws rules, and
others have relied on federal precedents. In most instanes it is impossible
to tell why, the partieular law was chosen as being controlling, since no
authorities are cited and both federal and state decisions would reach the
same result.
Three of the six cases in which the federal courts have definitely based
their choice of law on the choice of law rules of the state where the feder-
al court was sitting, arose in the Ninth Circuit.: ' The others arose in
the Southern District of New York in the Second Circuit, in the Western
District of Oklahoma in the Tenth Circuit, and in the District of MIaryland
in the Fourth Circuit.-- In none of these cases did it make any difference
whether federal or state conflict of laws rules were followed.
The cases in which federal precedents' are relied upon are also ones
where there was no real choice of law, since all possibilities would lead
to the same result.3 8 The same is, of course, true in the cases where it is
impossible to tell whether federal or state conflicts rules are being ap-
35. 304 U. S. 202, 208, n. 2: "Under the general doctrine the interpretation
of an insurance contract depends on the law of the place where the policy is
delivered. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 293 U. S. at 339. We do not now
determine which principle must be enforced if the Pennsylvania courts follow
a different conflict of laws rule."
It is not clear what conflict of laws rule was applied by the circuit court
of appeals after the case was remanded. Ruhlin v. New York Life Ins. Co.,
106 F. (2d) 921 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1939).
36. Schram v. Poole, P7 F. (2d) 566 (C. C. A. 9th, 1938); Schram v.
Smith, 97 F. (2d) 662 (C. C. A. 9th, 1938); Ostroff v. New York Life Ins.
Co., 23 F. Supp. 724 (S. D. Calif. 1938), rev'd on a construction of the policy
without citation of the Tompkins case, 104 F. (2d) 986 (C. C. A. 9th, 1939).
37. Cray, McFawn & Co. v. Hegarty, Conroy & Co., 27 F. Supp. 93 (S. D.
N. Y. 1939); Monahan v. New York Life Ins. Co., Mutual Life Ins. Co. v.
Monahan, 26 F. Supp. 859 (W. D. Okla. 1939); First National Bank v. Mayor
and City Council, 27 F. Supp. 444 (D. Md. 1939).
At first glance the Monahan case would seem to be one in which it would
make some difference which law was applied. A different result would be
reached if the law of Arkansas, where the contract was made, were applied
rather than the law of New York, where the contrmt wis to be performed.
However, the conflict of laws rule of neither Oklahoma, the forum, nor the
federal courts would lead to an application of Arkansas law. In the Maryland
case federal decisions are also cited.
38. Malloy v. New York Life Ins. Co., 103 F. (2d) 439 (C. C. A. 1st, 1939);
Wunderlich v. National Surety Corp., 24 F. Supp. 640 (D. Minn. 1938); New
York Life Ins. Co. v. Ruhlin, 25 F. Supp. 65 (W. D. Pa. 1938); Dorman v.
John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co., 25 F. Supp. 889 (S. D. Calif. 1939). It
is interesting that the same judge, Yankwich, J., wrote the opinions in the
Dorman case and the Ostroff case, supra note 36. In one case he definitely
relied on state conflicts rules and in the other he apparently relied on federal
precedents.
11
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plied.3 9 We must await the determination of a case where it would make
some difference whether the state or federal conflict of laws rule was ap-
plied. Until such a case arises it cannot be said that there is any definite
authority on the problem of what choice of law rules are to govern.
Because Swift v. Tyson and Erie Railroad v. Tompkins were both
diversity of citizenship cases, the doctrines which they established are
generally referred to as having applicability only when the jurisdiction
of the federal court is based on diversity of citizenship. 40 But is there
any reason for so limiting the Tompkins case? Mr. Justice Brandeis in the
majority opinion says.
"Except in matters governed by the Federal Constitution
or by Acts of Congress, the law to be applied in any case is the
law of the State There is no federal general common
law " 41
In view of this wording it would not seem that a particular issue, not in
itself covered by the Federal Constitution or by an Act of Congress, should
be decided in a manner at variance with state law simply because jurisdic-
tion was based upon some federal statute. Regardless of what the basis
of jurisdiction may be,42 if there is no federal common law, the federal
courts have no alternative but to apply the state law, where the Federal
Constitution or Acts of Congres& do not govern the precise problem. Thus,
no reason appears for limiting the Tompkins doctrine to diversity cases,
and the courts have -ot so limited it.
Several cases have arisen wherein the jurisdiction of the fedieral courts
was based upon the fact that the proceeding was one for winding up the
39. Rachlin v. Libby-Owens-Ford Glass Co., 96 F. (2d) 597 (C. C. A. 2d,
1938); Sommer v. Nakdimen, 97 F. (2d) 715 (C. C. A. 8th, 1938); Myers
v. Ocean Accident & Guarantee Corp., 99 F. (2d) 485 (C. C. A. 4th, 1938);
Mutual Benefit, Healti & Accident Ass'n v. Bowman, 99 F. (2d) 856 (C. C. A.
8th, 1938); Luhman v. Hoover, 100 F. (2d) 127 (C. C. A. 6th, 1938); Bissonette
v. National Biscuit Co., 100 F. (2d) 1003 (C. C. A. 2d, 1939); Bruun v. ttanson,
103 F. (2d) 685 (C. C. A. 9th, 1939); General Petroleum Corp. v. Oeaboard
Terminals Corp., 23 F. Supp. 137 (D. Md. 1938).
40. Many of the articles written about Swift v. Tyson used it as an argu-
ment -for revising or abolishing diversity jurisdiction. See especially Ball,
Revision of Federal Diversity Jurisdiction (1933) 28 ILL. L. REV. 356; Brown,
The Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts Based on Diversity of Citizenship (1929)
78 U. OF PA. L. REv. 179; Campbell, Is Swift vs. Tyson an Argument For
or Against Abolishing Diversity of Citizenship Jurisdiction? (1932) 18 A. B. A.
J. 809; Frankfurter, Distribution of Judicial Power Between United States and
State Courts (1928) 13 CORN. L. Q. 499; Parker, The Federal Jurisdiction and
Recent Attacks Upon It (1932) 18 A. B. A. J. 433; Warren, Corporations and
Diversity of Citizenship (1933) 19 VA. L. REV. 661; Yntema, The Jurisdietion
of the Federal Courts in Controversies Between Citizens of Different States
(1933) 19 A. B. A. J. 71.
41. Erie Railroad Y. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64, 78 (1937).
42. See Shulman, supra note 12, at 1350.
[ Vol. 5
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affairs of a national bank.4 3  The leading decision was handed down by
the Supreme Court in Wichita Royally Vo. v. City National Bank."1 In
a suit in state court by a solvent national bank on a promissory note, the
defendant trust filed a cross-complaint seeking to impose liability on the
bank for aiding a previous trustee in his violation of the trust. The Texas
Supreme Court finally set out certain strict rules concerning the liability
of the bank. 5 These rules were to be applied by the trial court after
further findings of fact.
The bank having closed, the suit became in effect one to wind up the
affairs of a national bank. The federal district court granted the petition
of the bank for removal,46 took jurisdiction, but refused to follow the
Texas Supreme Court.47  Instead it applied its own more lenient rules re-
garding the liability of the bank for aiding in the spoilation of the trust
fund. The circuit court of appeals remanded the case for failure to
comply with Equity Rule 70 .48 It did, however, decide the law appli-
cable.49 After the decision in the Tompkins case the circuit court of ap-
peals disavowed any intention not to be bound by the Texas rule,50 but
went on to point out that a case involving similar issues which had been
heard at the same time by the Texas Supreme Court, had been reversed
on rehearing."
Certiorari was granted by the Supreme Court. 2" The Court unani-
mously held that, "It was the duty of the federal court to apply the law
of Texas as declared by its court." The Court went on to point out
that the Texas court in the later decision, which was relied upon by the
43. The federal courts a.e expressly given jurisdiction over suits for wind-
ing up the affairs of a naz;tinal bank, 36 STAT. 1092 (1911), 28 U. S. C. § 41
(16) (1934). See Note, The Applicability of State Laws to National Banks
(1935) 35 COL. L. Rzv. 416, for a discussion of the situation prior to the Tomp-
kins case; also Willing v. Binenstock, 302 U. S. 272 (1937).
44. 306 U. S. 103 (1939).
45. 127 Tex. 158, 93 S. W. (2d) 143 (1936).
46. 18 F. Supp. 609 (N. D. Tex. 1937). Also appearing in this action is
a new bank which had been formed to take over the best assets of the closed
bank and to assume certain liabilities, not including the elaim of the trust. New
claims were filed by the trust attacking the sale of assets as an attempt to
create a preference and seeking to have the assets in the hands of the new bank
declared to be held on a constructive trust for the creditors of the old bank.
47. 18 F. Supp. 795 (N. D. Tex. 1937).
48. This rule provides for separate findings of fact and conclusions of
law. This has been superceded by Rule 52 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.
49. 95 F. (2d) 671 (C. C. A. 5th, 1938).
50. 97 F. (2d) 249 (C. C. A. 5th, 1938).
51. Quanah, A. & P. Ry. v. Wichita State Bank & Trust Co., 127 Tex. 407,
93 S. W. (2d) 701 (1936).
52. 305 U. S. 587 (1938).
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circuit court of appeals, had distinguished its own decision in the Wichita
case, leaving it unimpaired as authority. For that reason the Supreme
Court reversed the circuit court of appeals and remanded the case.
Thus, the word of the Supreme Court itself is authority for the
proposition that the doctrine of Eric Railroad v. Tompkins is not limited
to diversity of citizenship cases.
In a later case the Supreme Court, with Mr. Justice Stone again speak-
ing for the majority, refused to apply the 'ompkins doctrine to an action
by a receiver of a closed national bank against a director." The suit was
brought on a promissory note given by the director to cover up an unlaw-
ful holding by the bank of its own stock. The director sought to show
the true nature of the transaction and to set up an agreement that the
note would not be enforced. In answer to the contention that state law
should govern, the Court held that since the thing done was one enjoined by
federal statute the result of that act was also a question of federal law.
In so holding the Court did not overrule the Wichita case, but merely
tacitly limited that case and the Tompkins case to non-federal questions.
The lower federal courts have split on the question of the applicabil-
ity of state law in suits for winding up the affairs of a national bank.
Some. courts have said without hesitation that the Tompkins case has ab-
solutely no effect in such actions.5 4 The Wichita case indicates that such
broad statements are incorrect. On the other hand, Deitrick v. Grealley
makes it just as apparent that the rulings may be correct as to those par-
ticular casesY5
The constructive trust issue in the Wichita case was not discussed by
the Supreme Court. However, there can be little doubt but that the
53. Deitrick v. Greaney, 60 Sup. Ct. 104 (U. S. 1940).
54. Downey v. Yonkers, 23 F. Supp. 1018, 1023 (S. D. N. Y. 1938), qff'd,
106 F. (2d) 69 (C. C. A. 2d, 1939), cert. granted, 60 Sup. Ct., 298 (U. S. 1940).
The case was assigned for argument in the Supreme Court for the weeks of
Feb. 26 and Mar. 4, 1940.
Bradford v. Chase National Bank, 24 F. Supp. 28 (S. D. N. Y. 1938). The
Downey case involved the question of whether the receiver of a national bank
could recover payments made under mistake of law, and the Bradford case of
whether a constructive trust should be imposed on the sale of securities pledged,
by the closed bank, to secure deposits of the Philippine government.
55. One case, in which the court refused to follow the Tompkins case, which
may fall into this group is Atherton v. Anderson, 99 F. (2d) 883 (C. C. A.
6th. 1988). The suit was brought by the receiver of a national bank against the
directors for damages by negligent management. The essential problem in-
volved in both the Wichita and Atherton cases is one of standard of care. The
decision was rendered upon the mandate of the Supreme Court, 302 U. S. 643
(1937). to determine the question of common law liability.
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Court would have applied state law had it -considered the question.5 6
Whether or not a constructive trust, or, as in Reno National Bank v. Sea-
born ; an implied in fact trust, exists is not governed by the Federal
Constitution or by an Act of Congress. Therefore the case from the
Southern District of New York, in which the court refuses to apply state
rules in order to decide whether a trust existed as to the proceeds from
the sale of wrongfully pledged assets, seems wrong. 8 The solution to the
problem reached by the District Court for the District of Oregon seems to
be a satisfactory one. That court, in Bryant v. Linn County, 9 drew a
distinction between transactions which are in the normal course of its
business, and relations arising out of insolvency."0 To this solution, how-
ever, must be added the limitation implicit in Deitrick v. Greaney.13
56. This indicates one place where the Tompkins case may have unfor-
tunate results. The federal courts have developed definite rules on the con-
structive trust problem, whereas the 'state decisions are in a state of confusion.
See Townsend, Constructive Trusts and Bank Collections (1930) 39 YALE L.
J. 980; Bogert, Failed Banks, Collection Items, and Trust Preferences (1931)
29 MIcH. L. REv. 545. Apparently the federal precedents are to be discarded and
the confusion of the state decisions is to govern. State decisions which hold
that a trust, which did not previously exist, arises on insolvency probably will
not be followed since that would create a preference contrary to federal statute.
REV. STAT. § 5236 (1875), 12 U. S. C. § 194 (1934); Jennings v. United States
Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 294 U. S. 216 (1935). See infra p. 14, Bryant v. Linn
County.
57. 99 F. (2d) 482 (C. C. A. 9th, 1938). The question involved was whether
an implied in fact trust had been created by refusal of a national bank to pay out
funds on the demand of the receiver of the closed state bank for whom the
funds were held on deposit. It was held that in the absence of federal statute
the creditor rights of a depositor and the effect of the conduct of the bank were
dependent on state law.
In this instance the Nevada rule was in accord with the federal decisions,
and it was found that there was no trust. A simple debtor-creditor relationship
existed and the mere refusal of the debtor to pay did not transform the funds
in its hands into a trust res.
58. Bradford v. Chase National Bank, 24 F. Supp. 28 (S. D. N. Y. 1938).
59. 27 F. Supp. 562 (D. Ore. 1938). This is not a constructive trust case.
However, the same principles are applicable.
60. Entirely consistent with this view is a prior decision by the same court
in which it refused to apply state law in deciding whether interest should be
allowed on unnecessary double liability payments made by stockholders. Mc-
Carty v. Gault, 24 F. Supp. 977 (D. Ore. 1938). See infra note 67. However,
in the provision for repayment to stockholders of assessments paid in, nothing
is said as to interest. 27 STAT. 345 (1893), 12 U. S. C. § 197 (1934). See infra
note 67.
61. Other banking cases in which the courts have applied the Tompkins
doctrine are: Reconstruction Finance Corp. v. O'Keefe, 98 F. (2d) 820 (C. C.
A. 3rd, 1938) (New Jersey law was applied in deciding whether the pledgee of
a note was entitled to the proceeds of security originally given to secure the note,
but of which the pledgee had no knowledge at the time the note was taken. The
security had been disposed of by the receiver of a closed national bank.);
Schram v. Poole, 97 F. (2d) 566 (C. C. A. 9th, 1938); Schram v. Smith, 97 F.
(2d) 662 (C. C. A. 9th, 1938). Diversity of citizenship was present in these
cases in addition to the fact that they were suits to wind up the affairs of a
national bank. Both were suits by the receiver of a national bank to recover
against stockholders on the double liability provisions. Ordinarily such liability
15
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The federal jurisdiction in bankrupt.y is exclusive. For that reason
there has been considerable question raised as to whether the Tompkins
case would have any effect on the non-federal questions in hankruptcy. It
is difficult, however, to see how the problem differs greatly from that pres-
ent in the banking eases just diseussed. The similarity is clearly pointed
out by the case of In re Kountze Bros.," which involved a failed private
bank. The precise question was whelher certain money deposited for
the payment of bonds of the city of Los Angeles constituted a special
deposit so as to entitle the city to a preferred claim. In accord with
the general view state law was applied in determining that it was not a
special deposit.6 3 On the other hand, in In rc Koeppel,"4 where a eon-
struction of the bankruptcy act was involved, the District Court for tlhe
Eastern District of New York refused to apply state law. Although there
are statements in the latter which go too far in denying the applicability
of the Tompkins case in bankruptcy proceedings, the cases do not seem to
be in conflict.
In taxation there are a number of problems which may be affected by
state law. One extremely interesting question arose in connection with
the determination of capital gains for income tax purposes. It became
necessary to fin& the value of a water company's property as of 1917 in
order to establish a case for calculation of the amount of capital gain.
The District Court for the Northern District of California held that since
California includes in utility valuation an allowance for paving over mains,
such an allowance was to be included for income tax purposes.0 5  The
is purely statutory. The remedy to be pursued is the one provided by local law
for collecting like claims. Cf. Pufahl v. Estate of Parks, 299 U. S. 217 (1936);
Tobin v. Hymers, 99 F. (2d) 740 (C. C. A. 9th, 1938).
62. 103 F. (2d) 785 (C. C. A. 2d, 1939), cert. denied, 60 Sup. Ct. 110 (U.
S. 1939).
63. Other bankruptcy cases in which state law has been appled are:
In re Smith, 23 F. Supp. 174 (S. D. W. Va. 1938) (validity as an assixmr'ient of
a letter offering to assign which was written more than four months before
bankruptcy) ; Investors Syndicate v. Smith, 105 F.- (2d) 611 (C. C. A. 9th,
1939) (right to rents as between trustee and mortgagee); In re Grodzins, 27
F. Supp. 521 (S. D. Calif. 1939) (homestead exemption); National Automatic
Tool Co. v. Goldie, 27 F. Supp. 399 (D. Minn. 1939) (right to garnishee ex-
pected dividend in hands of trustee, state law as to whether can garnishee for
this type of claim and this type of asset, federal law as to whether goods custodia
in legis may be garnisheed); Cf. In re Wiegand, 27 F. Supp. 725 (S. D. Calif.
1939) (interpretation of state statute to determine validity of lien); Prudential
Ins. Co. of America v. Land Estates, 27 F. Supp. 668 (S. D. N. Y. 1939) (right
of mortgage holder to have claim allowed in full without deduction of security.
State and federal rules the same); In re Pointer Brewing Co., 105 F. (2d)
478 (C. C. A. 8th, 1939) (validity of conditional sales contract).
64. 24 F. Supp. 703 (E. D. N. Y. 1938).
65. East Bay Water Co. v. McLaughlin, 24 F. Supp. 222 (N. D. Calif.
[ Vol. 5
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Tompkins case was cited as authority for the proposition that California
decisions were to determine the items to be ineluded in the valuation.
"
The case is a troublesome one and just what place it will have in the devel-
opment of Erie Railroad v. Tompkins is difficult to say. 7
The possibility that the Tompkins ease may have some effect on the
general field of federal taxation and the specific subject of taxation of
community property rights was recognized in United States v. Goodyear."8
Likewise the possibility of some effect in the gift tax field was recognized
1938), appeal dismissed by stipulation of counsel, 104 F. (2d) 1016 (C. C. A.
9th, 1939).
66. The problem presented by this ruling is, of course, entirely different
from that presented in the ordinary utilities rate case. In a rate case the prob-
lem is what items must the state commission include in order to meet the
requirements of "due process." But, having met the requirements of the
Fourteenth Amendment, the state may include additional items in the valuation.
The East Bay Water Co. case holds that where valuation is necessary in fed-
eral court the state law is to be applied to determine what additional items
over and above the requirements of due process must be included in the
valuation. Cf. Cedar Rapids Gas Light Co. v. Cedar Rapids, 223 U. S. 655
(1912); Des Moines Gas Co. v. Des Moines, 238 U. S. 153 (1915).
67. One problem presented is whether the case means that words used,
but not defined, in a federal act are to be interpreted in each case in light of
the state decisions of the forum. For example, does the case mean that the
word "value" in the Federal Estate Tax, § 302, which the Treasury Department
has interpreted to mean fair market value (Reg. 80, Art. 10 (a), p. 28), is to be
modified by varying state decisions as to what shall constitute "fair market
value"? It is doubtful that the East Bay Water Co. case, if upheld and followed,
will be carried that far. Certainly the constitutional basis of the Tompkins
decision does not require such a holding. It can be safely said that if Congress
has power to pass an act, the federal courts have power to construe that act.
(Cf. the discussion infra p. 37 as to state court interpretation of state statutes.)
The problem is in determining when the court stops construing the statute
and begins applying common law principles not in accord with the common
law principles of the state in question, a thing which the Tompkins case
says is beyond the federal power. This is a problem which only the Supreme
Court can answer and on which its answer will be final. A case which suggests
this problem in the national banking field is McCarty v. Gault, 24 F. Supp.
977 (D. Ore. 1938). A higher federal court might easily find that the district
court in that case in allowing interest on excess assessments paid in by stock-
holders, had gone beyond the point of statutory interpretation and was apply-
ing common law principles. The policy basis of the Tompkins decision requires
only that the line be drawn definitely so that the possibility of different results
in the same jurisdiction in the same type of case will be reduced to a minimum.
That is if the line is drawn definitely and it is said that a certain matter is
interpretation then the federal courts can force the states into line by use
of the right to appeal on a substantial federal question. See infra note 77.
68. 99 F. (2d) 523 (C. C. A. 9th, 1938). Speaking of the statement in
Burnet v. Harmel, 287 U. S. 103, 110 (1932), that "State law may control
only when the federal taxing act, by express language or necessary implication,
makes its own operation dependent upon state law," the circuit court of appeals
in a footnote to the Goodyear case said, "The effect of Erie Railroad Co. v.
Tompkins . . . [citation! and Ruhlin v. New York Life Ins. Co . ..
[citation] . . ., if any, on this rule is yet to be determined." The question
as to community property rights is answered by Lang v. Commissioner, 304
U. S. 264 (1938), where it was held that state community property law is
applicable in determining the amount of the gross estate. Poe v. Seaborn, 282
U. S. 101 (1930), answers the question as to income tax. 17
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in Hughes v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue."9 The Tompkins case has
been relied upon by the Circuit Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in
determining what was the nature of the decedent's interest for estate tax
purposes, 0 and by the District Court for the Southern District of Cali-
fornia in determining what are proper charges and expenses against th e
estate.-' It is doubtful whether these cases go any further than the pre-
vious rules as to applicability of local rules of property in federal taxa-
tion. 2 However, there is the suggestion that the Tompkins case may have
some effect. As yet it is too early to tell just what the effect will be.
Since the Tompkins case is not to be limited to diversity cases, the
problem of what will be the effect on other types of federal jurisdiction-3
such as admiralty, 74 patents, copyrights, 5 etc.,-, presents itself. The ans-
wer would seem to be that state law is to govern non-federal questions in
the federal courts regardless of the basis of jurisdiction. The difficult
problem of determining what are federal and what are non-federal ques-
tions remains, but this does not mean that the situation of Swift v. Tyson,
where it was necessary what was ."general" and what was "local" law,
has been recreated. Rather it is a question of determining whether state
law is not to govern the precise question because, "the Constitution, treat-
ies, or statute- -of the United States otherwise provide." All other ques-
tions are to be governed by state law, decisional or statutory.
The line of demarcation between federal and non-federal questions is
69. 104 F. (2d) 144 (C. C. A. 9th, 1939).
70. Page v. Hoxie, 104 F. (2d) 918 (C. C. A. 1st, 1939).
71. United States v. Security-First Nat. Bank, 30 F. Supp. 113 (S. D.
Calif. 1939).
72. The field of local rules of property in federal taxation is one which is
in great confusion and as yet nothing satisfactory has been written in it.
Cf. such cases as, Crooks v. Harrelson, 282 U. S. 55 (1930); Tyler v. United
States, 281 U. S. 497 (1930); Lyeth v. Hoey, 305 U. S. 188 (1938).
73. One type of federal jurisdiction to which it might be said that the
doctrine has been expanded is appeal from territorial courts. In Waialua Agri-
cultural Co. v. Christian, 305 U. S. 91 (1938), the Court refused to reverse a
decision of the Supreme Court of Hawaii unless it was manifestly erroneous.
The situation is not the same, of course, because it is a direct appeal and the
court does have the power to reverse. Compare Carscadden v. Territory of
Alaska, 105 F. (2d) 377 (C. C. A. 9th, 1939), which reaches a different result
in the case of an appeal from the District -Court for Alaska.
74. See McCormick & Hewins, supra note 12, at 141, 142, for a discussion of
the possible effect on admiralty. At least one admiralty case has come before
the Supreme Court since the Tompkins case with no mention of the problem.
Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. v. Smith, 305 U. S. 424 (1939). The applicability of
local law was urged, but denied in Barndt v. Det Bergenske Dampskibsselskab,
28 F. Supp. 815 (S. D. N. Y. 1938).
75. Cf. Century Distilling Co. v. Continental Distilling Co., 106 F. (2d)
486 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1939) (trade marks).
76. The jurisdiction of the district courts is set out in Judicial Code,
Sec. 24, amended, 28 U. S. C. § 41 (1934).
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as yet not clearly drawn. 7- Thus far we have dealt in the main with cases
in which the courts have considered the questions to be non-federal and
have applied the doctrine. But it is just as important to consider those
cases where the doctrine has been asserted and rejected.
The cases in which the Tompkins case has been rejected are rather
scattered, and, for the most part, not of a type from which satisfactory
generalizations can be drawn. Reasons given for refusing to apply state
decisions have been that the particular problem was procedural and not
substantive,7 ' and that the question was strictly federal. At present, in
attempting to draw the line between federal and non-federal questions, we
are interested particularly in the latter group of cases. The substantive-
pro'edural questions will be discussed later.
7
1
As mentioned previously, the Tompkins case has been said by some
courts to be inapplicable in national banking80 and in bankruptcy cases."
The reason given in those cases was that the jurisdiction was exclusively
federal. Since, as has been suggested, the exclusiveness of the federal
courts' jurisdiction is not a valid test, it is apparent that those cases are of
no assistance in determining what questions are federal.
Of course, the question of federal jurisdiction is itself a federal ques-
tion 2 In addition it has been held that the right of a federal grand jury
to indict, after a previous jury had refused to do so, is not effected by
a New York rule against resubmittal.13  The court said that since the
grand jury which found the indictment was one set up under federal law,
its powers were to be construed by interpreting that federal law. Similar-
77. Although the problem here is not exactly the same as that of determi-
ning what is a federal question for purposes of appeal from decisions of
the highest court of a state to the United States Supreme Court under Judicial
Code, Sec. 237, amended, 43 STAT. 937 (1925), 28 U. S. C. 344 (1934), those
cases may be of some help here. A recent case on that problem is Lovell v.
Griffin, 303 U. S. 444 (1938), decided less than a month before the Tompkins
case. The court there held that what is a federal question is itself a federal
question. For a recent discussion of that field see Rubin and Willner, Obliga-
tory Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court: Appeals from State Courts under
Section 237(a) of the Judicial Code (1939) 37 MIcH. L. REV. 540.
78. Summers v. Hearst, 23 F. Supp. 986 (S. D. N. Y. 1938); F. & M.
Skirt Co. v. A. Wimpfheimer & Bro., 25 F. Supp. 898 (D. Mass. 1939); Cities
Service Oil Co. v. Dunlap, 101 F. (2d) 314 (C. C. A. 5th, 1939).
79. Infra p. 19, et seq.
80. Downey v. Yonkers, 23 F. Supp. 1018 (S. D. N. Y. 1938); Bradford v.
Chase National Bank, 24 F. Supp. 28 (S. D. N. Y. 1938); McCarty v. Gault, 24
F. Supp. 977 (D. Ore. 1938).
81. ln re Koeppel, 24 F. Supp. 703 (E. D. N. Y. 1938).
82. Neirbo Co. v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 103 F. (2d) 765 (C. C. A.
2d, 1939), rev'd on other grounds, 60 Sup. Ct. 153 (U. S. 1939) ; Cf. Oklahoma
Packing Co. v. Oklahoma Gas & Electric Co., 60 Sup. Ct. 215 (U. S. 1939).
83. United States v. Warren, 26 F. Supp. 333 (E. D. N. Y. 1939).
19
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ly, it has been held that in applying the Seventh Amendment guarantee-
ing trial by jury in suits at common law, federal courts are not bound by
state decisions as to what constitute legal actions. 4 The problem whether
a corporation is doing business within a state, so as to make service of
summons on an officer valid as against the corporation, has been held to
involve federal questions and to be one on which federal courts are not
bound by state decisions.s ' Nor is the United States, suing on behalf of
an Indian ward to recover taxes paid, bound by a special state statute of
limitations for tax claims.88 The reason given was that the federal control
over Indian lands is exclusive and supreme. Federal courts, in determin-
ing what is a "controversy" under the Federal Declaratory Judgment
Act, 7 need not consider state decisions,8 1 and, finally, it has been held
that the doctrine has no effect on orders of the Federal Trade Commis-
sion. 9 - These cases are of small assistance in drawing the line, but it is
by just such cases as these that, over a period of years, the line between
federal and non-federal questions will be marked out.
Since the Tompkins case is said to apply only to matters of substantive
lawY0 one of the most important problems raised is the distinction between
substance and procedure. As has been pointed out by Professor, W. AV.
Cook. "substance" an& "procedure" may have different meanings for
84. Hollingsworth v. General Petroleum Corp., 26 F. Supp. 917 (D. Ore.
1939).
85. Pioneer Utilities Corp. v. Scott-Newcomb, Inc., 26 F. Supp. 616 (E. D.
N. Y. 1939); Hedrick v. Canadian Pacific Ry., 28 F. Supp. 257 (S. D. Ohio
1939).
86. Board of Commissioners v. United States, 100 F. (2d) 929 (C. C. A.
10th, 1938), rev'd on other grounds, 60 Sup. Ct. 285 (U. S. 1939). Mr. Justice
Frankfurter takes the view that the Tompkins case is inapplicable since the
case arises under a treaty of the United States.
87. 48 STAT. 955 (1934), 49 STAT. 1027 (1935), 28 U. S. C. § 400 (Supp.
1938).
88. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Koch, 102 F. (2d) 288 (C.
C. A. 3rd, 1939).
89. National Candy Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 104 F. (2d) 999(C. C. A. 7th, 1939).
90. This statement is supported by the wording of the majority opinion
in the Tompkins case. It says, ". . . Congress has no power to declare sub-
stantive rules of common law applicable in a State . . ." The concurring
opinion of Mr. Justice Reed, 304 U. S. 64, 90, 92 (1937), states that no one
doubts the federal power over procedure. He justifies his statement on the
basis of the necessary and proper clause of Art. 1, Sec. 8 of the Constitution.
This view is further supported by the fact that the Court has adopted the
Rules of Civil Procedure and since the Tompkins case has not withdrawn them
as it has power to do. The view is taken by the leading writers on the subject,
see particularly Note (1938) 38 COL. L. REv. 1472; Schmidt, Substantive Law
Applied by the Federal Courts-Effect of Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins (1938)
16 TEX. L. REv. 512; Shulman, supra, note 12, at 1351; Comment (1939) 37
MIcH. L. REv. 1249; Tunks, supra note 12.
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different purposes." Between the extremes of matters which clearly fall
into one group or the other, there is a field in which classification is de-
pendent upon the purpose for which it is desired. Since the purpose of
the Tompkins case, as indicated by the wording of the opinion and the
criticisms which it makes of Swift v. Tyson, is to promote conformity of
results within the geographical area of each state, 92 it would seem that all
matters should be classified as substantive which might bring about a
result in federal court different from that which would be reached on the
same facts in state court. On the other hand, matters which are not
likely to affect the result but which are concerned with the mere me-
chanics of getting the issues before the court, should be classified as
procedural. Of course, the line between substance and procedure for the
purpose of the Tompkins case will have to be drawn by the courts over a
period of years. Nevertheless, the classification above may serve as a
useful tool for determining whether the cases thus far decided fall into
any orderly pattern, or whether they are hopelessly in conflict.
At the very time that the Supreme Court declared that federal courts
were bound to follow state rules of substantive law, there was in existence,
waiting to become effective, a set of procedural rules which would free the
federal courts from conformity to state procedure. One of the first prob-
lems which must be discussed under the topic substance and procedure,
is the possibility of conflict between the new Rules of Civil Procedure 3
and the doctrine of the Tompkins case.9 4 Theoretically there should be no
such conflict, since the Act of June 19, 1934, which empowers the Supreme
Court to prescribe the rules, states that:
91. Cook, supra note 30.
92. Of course, the decision in the Tompkins case is based on two grounds,
Constitutional power and policy. That is, the decision is based first on the propo-
sition that the federal government is without constitutional power to declare
rules of decisions applicable within a state, and second on the proposition that,
as a matter of policy, it is a good thing to promote uniformity within a state.
It is submitted that there is nothing in the constitutional basis which should
compel the courts to draw the line between substance and procedure in a manner
different from that required by the policy which the case adopts. The argument
might be set forth that the constitutional basis of the decision requires that sub-
stance and procedure be defined as they were in 1789. It seems doubtful that
the Court will take such a narrow view.
93. Rules of Civil Procedure for the District Courts of the United States
adopted by the Supreme Court of the United States pursuant to 48 STAT. 1064,
28 U. S. C. § 723b, 723c. (1934).
94. It is suggested in 38 COL. L. REV. at 1474, that there is a latent con-
flict between the policy of the Tompkins case and the policy of the Rules. Prior
to writing the opinion in the Tompkins case, Mr. Justice Brandeis had refused
to concur in the adoption of the Federal Rules. The possibility of a connection
between the two is a matter upon which there might be considerable speculation. 21
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"Said rules shall neither abridge, enlarge, nor modify the
substantive rights of any litigant." 5
However, a possibility of conflict presents itself in Rule 8(c) which sets
forth a list of defenses to be affirmatively pleaded. Among the defenses
so listed is contributory negligence. In some states, however, alleging and
proving freedom from contributory negligence is made a part of the
plaintiff's case.9 6
The contributory negligence problem came before the District Court
for the Eastern District of IllinoisY7  Defendant entered a motion to dis-
miss plaintiff's petition for insufficiency. He reasoned that under the
Tompkins case Illinois law should govern and that the petition did not
contain an allegation of freedom from contributory negligence such as is
required by Illinois law. The plaintiff contended that the question was
a procedural one to be governed by Rule 8(c). The court relied on earlier
cases wherein the federal courts9 had refused to follow state rules as
to contributory negligence. Since the cases relied upon were decided while
the Conformity Act9" was in effect, the court felt that they were authority
for the proposition that the matter was substantive and not procedural.
The court, therefore, held that the Illinois rule rather than Rule 8(c)
should govern.
One writer has expressed the view that it is carrying the Tompkins
case to unnecessary lengths to conclude that pleading is a matter of sub-
stance in this instance.' This criticism of Francis v. Humphrey seems a
justifiable one. Rules as to which party should raise a certain issue are
mere rules governing the mechanics of getting the issues before the court
and will not bring a different result in federal court. Therefore, the
Tompkins ease gives no basis for saying that state rules must govern mat-
ters of pleading in this instance.
In Schopp v. Muller Dairies,'0' the contributory negligence problem
95. Act of June 19, 1934, c. 651, § 1, 48 STAT. 1064, 28 U. S. C. § 723b(1934).
96. For a discussion of this problem see Comment (1939) 37 MicH. L. REV.
1249. The author there lists Illinois, Connecticut, Iowa, Maine, New York,
Vermont and Michigan as among the states which have this rule in varying
forms. See also, Notes (1939) 27 GEO. L. J. 375, (1939) 24 IowA L. REav. 609,(1939) 6 U. oF CI. L. REV. 510.
97. Francis v. Humphrey, 25 F. Supp. 1 (E. D. Ill. 1938).
98. Central Vermont Ry. v. White, 238 U. S. 507 (1915), and cases there
cited.99. REv. STAT. § 914 (1875), 28 U. S. C. § 724 (1934).
100. Note (1938) 38 COL. L. REv. 1472, 1478.
101. 25 F. Supp. 50 (E. D. N. Y. 1938). The decision was handed down after
the effective date (Sept. 16, 1938) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, but there was
no discussion of them.
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arose, not as a question of pleading,' - but as a question of burden of proof.
The court held that the question was one of substantive law to be governed
by state rules. This conclusion is not open to the same attack which has
been leveled against the Humphrey case. Placing the burden of proof on
the plaintiff rather than on the defendant is more than a mere matter of
mechanics. Application in federal court of a rule different from the
state rule might very easily bring about a different result on the same set
of facts.'0 3
The burden of proving, in a suit to quiet title, that the plaintiff is or
is not a bona fide purchaser, has been held by the Supreme Court to be
a matter of substance and hence within the scope of the Tompkins case."0 4
Similarly it has been held that the question whether the burden of proof,
as to intent to deceive, is shifted by raising a presumption of fraudulent
intent, is to be governed by state law."0 5 The line between substance and
procedure seems to be drawn in a manner in keeping with the spirit of
the Tompkins case in these two cases.
Closely akin to the question of burden of proof is the question of pre-
sumptions. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is often in effect a presump-
tion. Since application or non-application of the doctrine might have an
effect on the substantive rights of the parties, it was held in the Fourth
Circuit that state law should govern. 106 The court points out, however,
102. Among the other things which Rule 8(c) lists as affirmative defenses
are accord and satisfaction and set-off. Before the effective date of the Rules
these two came up, but, likewise, not as matters of pleading. In Panama City
v. Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, 97 F. (2d) 499 (C. C. A. 5th, 1938), Florida
decisions were applied to determine whether the assigned claim was subject to
a set-off, and in Wunderlich v. National Surety Corp., 24 F. Supp. 640 (D.
Minn. 1938), state rules were applied to determine whether there had been
an accord and satisfaction. Cf. Coos Bay Lumber Co. v. Collier, 104 F. (2d)
722 (C. C. A. 9th, 1939), as to accord and satisfaction. The Coos Bay case also
raises but does not decide the question whether res judicata is a matter of sub-
stantive law. On the res judicata point cf. Matthews v. Barker, 30 F. Supp.
464 (D. Idaho 1938).
103. The determination to follow state decisions in this field may serve to
lighten the load of the federal courts considerably in those states where the
burden is placed on the plaintiff. One big reason why plaintiffs in negligence ac-
tions were anxious to get into federal court has now been eliminated.
104. Cities Service Oil Co. v. Dunlap, 60 Sup. Ct. 201 (U. S. 1939), rev'g,
101 F. (2d) 314 (C. C. A. 5th, 1939). In this connection an interesting state-
ment appears in Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America v. Clum, 106 F. (2d) 592
(C. C. A. 3rd, 1939). After receiving judgment on the question whether the
Tompkins case should have any application to the entering of directed verdicts
and judgments non obstante eredicto, the court said, "A cogent argument for
putting the exercise of the n. 0. v. power in a category with res isa Zoquitur,
presumptions and burden of proof might be made. Such an argument leads to
its consideration as a procedure rather than a substantive question.
105. Equitable Life Assur. Soc. v. MacDonald, 96 F. (2d) 437 (C. C. A.
9th, 1938).
106. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Munn, 99 F. (2d) 190 (C. C. A. 4th, 1938). 23
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that even if they were to take the view that the matter was procedural,
state rules would apply.0 7
As to the presumption of correctness of the lower courts opinion and
the weight of evidence necessary for a reversal, the Eighth Circuit in
Egan Chevrolet Co. v. Bruner,0 8 relied solely on federal precedents.10
This case might seem to be out of line with the other presumption cases,
but in reality the problem is of ail entirely different nature. The court is
merely setting up a rule of court as a guidepost for determination of fact
questions. The opinion of the lower court is, in effect, one bit of evidence
which will be considered by the reviewing court, and the reviewing court
is entitled to decide for itself what weight it will give to that evidence.
If rules as to admissibility of evidence are found to be substantive
within the Tompkins case, another possibility of conflict with the Rules
of Civil Procedure suggests itself. Rule 43(a) reads as follows:
" . .All evidence shall be admitted which is admissible
under the statutes of the United States, or under the rules of evi-
dence heretofore applied in the courts of the United States on
the hearing of suits in equity, or under the rules of evidence ap-
plied in the courts of general jurisdiction of the state in which
the United States court is held. In any case, the statute or rule
which favors the reception of the evidence governs and the evi-
dence shall be presented according to the most convenient method
prescribed in any of the statutes or rules to which reference is
herein made. The competency of a witness to testify shall be de-
termined in like manner."
If these matters of the law of evidence are held to be substantive, the
clash will come when it is sought by reason of Rule 43(a) to introduce
evidence not admissible under state rules. There has been no occasion
for such a clash as yet since the cases which have relied upon the Tompkins
case have all been ones in which the evidence has been admissible under
state rules. M[ost of these cases were decided prior to the effective date of
the Rules, and none have mentioned the Rules.
Although the Supreme Court in Lyon v. Mutual Benefit Health &
For a more complete discussion of the theory of this case see Note (1938) 38
COL. L. REv. 1472, 1475. Cf. Allison v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 99
F. (2d) 507 (C. C. A. 4th, 1938).
107. 99 F. (2d) 190, 193 (C. C. A. 4th, 1938).
108. 102 F. (2d) 373 (C. C. A. 8th, 1939).
109. Similarly, federal-cases were relied upon to determine whether it was
error to refuse to give an instruction which, though for the most part correct,
was not exactly correct. Chicago, G. W. R. R. v. Robinson, 101 F. (2d) 994
(C. C. A. 8th, 1939). In the Robinson case the state rule was the same as the
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Accideut Ass'n,110 cited the Conformity Act as authority for the fact that
state rules should govern the admissibility of evidence, it also referred to
the Tompkins case and eases holding that under Section 34 of the Judiciary
Act state rules as to admissibility of evidence should govern."' From
the references made it is apparent that the court recognized a possibility
that the matter might be substantive and therefore within the rule of
the Tompkins case.
Cases in which lower federal courts have held state rules to govern
have involved the admissibility:112 of parol evidence, 1 3 of non-expert
testimony,14 of photographs,"3 of evidence challenged as being irrele-
vent, and of testimony of members of a jury to impeach its verdict." 7
In at least one instance federal cases have been relied upon as to the
proper scope of cross-examination."' s In none of these cases is there any
mention of the Conformity.Act.
With the possible exception of the last one, these cases are consistent
in the view that rules as to admissibility of evidence are, for purposes of
the Tompkins case, substantive. This view seems to be in accord with
the tentative classification of "Tompkins substance" as including matters
which might effect different results on the same fact. There can be no
doubt that the admissibility or non-admissibility of certain evidence may
very easily mean the difference between a judgment for the plaintiff and
a judgment for the defendant. The effect, if any, on the results of a law
suit of rules setting the limits of cross-examination is probably more
remote." 9 Yet the problem cannot be said to concern only the mechanics
of getting the facts before the court.
Tn Moore v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. R.,120 the question arose as to wheth-
110. 305 U. S. 484 (1939).
111. 305 U. S. at 489, notes 4 & 5.
112. Cf. Anglo California Nat. Bank v. Lazard, 106 F. (2d) 693 (C. C. A.
9th, 1939), weight to be given certain evidence.
113. Chinn v. Llangollen Stables, 25 F. Supp. 389 (E. D. Ky. 1938); see
Phillips v. Davidson, 24 F. Supp. 184 (E. D. S. C. 1938).
114. Pollard v. Nicholls, 99 F. (2d) 955 (C. C. A. 5th, 1938).
115. Chicago, G. W. R. R. v. Robinson, 101 F. (2d) 994 (C. C. A. 8th, 1939)..
116. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Munn, 99 F. (2d) 190 (C. C. A. 4th, 1938).
117. Norfolk & W. Ry. v. Riggs, 98 F. (2d) 612 (C. C. A. 6th, 1938). Ref-
erence is also made to federal decisions on the question.
118. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Conway, 102 F. (2d) 743 (C. C. A. 10th, 1939).
119. The evidence which is excluded as being beyond the proper scope of
cross-examination may be brought in by other means although at the expense
of such things as the right to impeach the witness or to ask leading questions.
As to the situation where a matter is admitted under federal rules which could
not have been introduced on cross-examination under state rules, a similar
argument may be used in the reverse.
120. 28 F. Supp. 804 (W. D. Mo. 1939), noted in (1940) 26 VA. L. REV. 375.
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er the action should be dismissed because plaintiff's only evidence was
contrary to common knowledge. After distinguishing the state decision
relied upon, the court went on to say that although it would be bound by
the rule that evidence contrary to common knowledge is inadmissible it
would not be bound by state determinations as to what was contrary to
common knowledge. The court is in effect saying that judicial notice is
procedural. In reaching such a conclusion the court is making it possible
for different results to be reached on exactly the same facts in federal and
state court. This is clearly inconsistent with the spirit and policy of the
Tompkins case.
Although there might be some discussion as to whether rules govern-
ing limitation of actions should be included in "Tompkins substance" or
in "Tompkins procedure," there is no real problem involved. The fed-
eral courts have no choice but to follow state rules. 12  If it is procedure,
it is procedure not covered by the Rules of Civil Procedure and hence
is governed by the Conformity Act. If it is substance, the Tompkins case
brings no change, since the rules are all statutory and within Section 34
of the Judiciary Act even as it was interpreted in Swift v. Tyson.'122
Since the equitable doctrine of laches is one which may effect the
result of a suit, it will tentatively be placed in the category of "Tompkins
substance." However, in light of the almost universal American conflict
of laws rule that limitations of actions is procedural, laches would seem by
analogy to be procedural .23 On a first hearing of Rosenthal v. New York
Life Ins. Co., 24 the circuit court applied its own rules as to laches. After
the case had been remanded by the Supreme Court,12 G Missouri decisions
relating to the doctrine of laches were applied, indicating that the court
121. The only choice is as to what state rule shall be followed. That is a
problem in conflict of laws substance and procedure. For general discussions
of limitation of actions and the conflict of laws see, Ailes, Limitation of Actions
and the Conflict of Laws (1933) 31 MIcH. L. REv. 474; Notes (1919) 28 YALE
L. J. 492, (1931) 79 U. op PA. L. Ray. 1112, (1933) 47 HARv. L. Ray. 315.
122. Cases, since the Tompkins case, which have cited it along with other
cases as authority for the proposition that state limitations should govern are:
Kansas Gas & Electric Co. v. Evans, 100 F. (2d) 549 (C. C. A. 10th, 1938);
Sommer v. Nakdimen, 97 F. (2d) 715 (C. C. A. 8th, 1938); Cooper v. Ohio Oil
Co., 25 F. Supp. 304 (D. Wyo. 1938); Pardue v. United Gas Public Service Co.,
28 F. Supp. 847 (W. D. La. 1939); Cf. Gallagher v. Carroll, 27 F. Supp. 568(E. D. N. Y. 1939). On the other hand, there is the fair possibility that noth-
ing remains of the Conformity Act whatsoever.
123. This analogy is not entirely proper since laches involves more than a
mere lapse of time.
124. 94 F. (2d) 675 (C. C. A. 8th, 1938).
125. 304 U. S. 263 (1938).
(Vol. 5
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considered the matter substantive." The result reached on the two
occasions was the same. Both the statute of limitations and laches were
pleaded as defenses in a single suit in equity for an accounting and to
recover damages for improper operation of the plaintiff's oil property. 12 7
The Wyoming Statute of Limitations was applied, but only federal deci-
sions were cited in deciding that the plaintiff was guilty of laches. The
doubt expressed by the court as to how far the Tompkins case should ap-
ply in suits of this character, greatly weakens the case as authority for
the proposition that laches is procedural.
Closely akin to laches but more clearly substantive are the questions
of whether notice has been given within a reasonable time under the
terms of an insurance policy 128 and whether there has been a waiver of a
condition in a policy' 9  In both instances state decisions have been ap-
plied.
In an action on an injunction bond, the question arose as to whether
attorney's fees could be included as an item of damages. State decisions
allowed such fees to be recovered in a suit on the bond, but the federal
district court refused to include them in the damages. '3  It based its con-
clusion on the argument that -the bond was a condition imposed by the
federal court and not a mere contract. Reliance was placed on an opinion
of Chief Justice Taney in which lie treated the matter as procedural.' 3'
Arguing in favor of the classification it might be said that the federal rule
is not one which affects the result of the suit. It merely affects the extent
of recovery. But, certainly, a difference in extent of recovery will be
such an advantage that non-residents will seek to obtain injunctions in
federal court rather than in state court. By so doing they will not be
126. 99 F. (2d) 578 (C. C. A. 8th, 1938). Consider this statement in
Bryant v. Linn County, 27 F. Supp. 562 (D. Ore. 1938), supra n. 59, "Either
on the ground of the construction of the federal statute or on the ground of
equitable doctrine of laches which is part of the substantive law of the State of
Oregon, the result is the same. (italics the author's)
127. Cooper v. Ohio Oil Co., 25 F. Supp. 304 (D. Wyo. 1938).
128. Fireman's Fund Indemnity Co. v. Kennedy, 97 F. (2d) 982 (C. C. A.
9th, 1938).
129. Manufacturers Casualty Ins. Co. v. Roach, 25 F. Supp. 852 (D. Md.
1939).
130. Travelers Mutual Casualty Co. v. Skeer, 24 F. Supp. 805 (W. D. Mo.
1938), appeal dismissed on stipulation of parties, 106 F. (2d) 1018 (C. C. A.
8th, 1939); Salvage Process Corp. v. Acme Tank Cleaning Process Corp., 104
F. (2d) 105 (C. C. A. 2d, 1939); Cf. Mercantile-Commerce Bank & Trust Co. v.
Southeast Arkansas Levee Dist., 106 F. (2d) 966 (C. C. A. 8th, 1939).
131. Bein v. Heath, 12 How. 168 (U. S. 1851). The court also relied on
Tullock v. Mulvane, 184 U. S. 497 (1902).
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liable to as great an extent should the court find that the preliminary
injunction was improperly granted.
In Su Ies ,. Harst, ' : the District Court for the oui llierI l)strit.
of New York refused to follow the state rule permitting a sho(khohh(r's
derivative aetion to be brought by one who became a slov lder after le
cause of action acerued. The matter was held to be provedural awd en,-
ered by the Federal Equity Rules rather than by state decisions.' ''his
decision does run contrary to the definition of "Tompkins substauwe,"
since it permits a different result in federal court.
1 34
The applicability of state decisions to the questions of amendment of
a pleading 35 and the right to use interrogatories for discovery of wit-
nesses'" has been denied. These matters concern only the method of
getting the issues before the court and are rightly classified as "Tompkins
procedure."" 7
The line between substance and procedure has just begun to be
drawn, but it is apparent from the above cases that, for the most part, it
is being drawn in keeping with the spirit of the Tompkins case.
132. 23 F. Supp. 986 (S. D. N. Y. 1938), Note (1938) 25 VA. L. Rnv. 100.
133. Federal Equity Rule 27. This rule has now been incorporated in the
Rules of Civil Procedure as Rule 23 (b). For a discussion of the history of
these two rules see, (1938) 38 COL. L. REV. at 1480.
134. An attempt to justify the decision might be made on the basis of a
policy to prevent the trumping up of diversity jurisdiction. Such a policy
seems hardly justifiable in this instance, however, when the fact is considered
that the federal court actually takes jurisdiction to dismiss the action and
thus in effect adjudicates the plaintiffs rights. Venner v. Great Northern Ry.,
209 U. S. 24 (1908).
The Tompkins case has eliminated one of the main reasons for trumping
up diversity jurisdiction. The rules to be applied are no longer different and
hence the reason for the policy in Rule 23 (b) is of less importance. However, in
this case an innocent stockholder is left entirely without a remedy unless the
state of incorporation permits a suit by one who acquired his stock subsequent
to the transaction in question. The matter is not res judicata and the resident
corporation cannot defeat the action by removal to federal court since that
right is open only to a non-resident. 36 STAT. 1094 (1910), 28 U. S. C. § 71
,1934).
135. Moore v. Illinois Central R. R., 24 F. Supp. 731 (S. D. Miss. 1938).
136. F. & M. Skirt Co. v. A. Wimpfheimer & Bro., 25 F. Supp. 898 (D.
'Mass. 1939).
137. The possibility of another problem in substance and procedure is sug-
gested in Iser v. Brockway, 25 F. Supp. 221 (W. D. Pa. 1938). The general
problem involved was whether proper service of summons had been made on a
rnon-resident motorist. It is impossible to tell from the opinion whether the
court considered the matter to be substantive or procedural. Both the Conformity
Act and the Tompkins case are cited. Practically there is no problem as to
substance and procedure involved since application of Rule 4(d) (1). (7) of
the Rules of Civil Procedure, which state that service in accordance with
state law is valid, would bring the same result which would be reached by de-
claring the matter to be substantive. The provision in Rule 4(d) (7) for
service according to the statutes of the United States is one which would come
within the exception to Sec. 34 of the Judiciary Act.
28
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One further problem which remains is the determination of what
is state decisional law. Mr. Justice Brandeis says:
"Except in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or
by Acts of Congress, the law to be applied in any case is the law
of the State. And whether the law of the State shall be declared
by its Legislature in a statute or by its highest court 3 in a
decision is not a matter of federal concern. There is no federal
general common law . . .39
What Mr. Justice Brandeis had-in mind when he used the words "highest
court" is the question.
It may be that he used the words merely as being symbolic of the
usual method by which case law is finally established as the law of a state.
But, if the federal courts have, as he goes on to say, ". no power
to declare rules of common law applicable in a State ",they would
not seem to be possessed of such a power simply because the highest court
of the state has not spoken. Are lower court decisions to be ignored? True,
they are often not binding even on the lower courts themselves, but quite
often they are acquiesced in by the highest court or are indicative of
what the highest court would decide were the problem presented to it.
But, even though lower court decisions are not to be ignored, the situation
may be presented where they are hopelessly in conflict or are entirely
lacking. In such a situation the federal courts must of necessity exercise
an independent judgment as to the law, guided, insofar as possible, by
the general attitude of the courts of the particular state. The determina-
tion of the court meaning and significance of Mr. Justice Brandeis' use
of the words "highest court" must await further judicial explanation. 40
It may be that they mean the highest court to which a litigant can go as a
matter of right, or the highest court to which the particular problem has
gone in the past. The natural meaning is the highest court which is set up
by the constitution or statutes of the state in question, and it is in that
sense that the words are used in the discussion which follows.
The cases which are of assistance in the solution of this problem fall
roughly into three classes: those where the highest court has spoken, those
138. Italics inserted.
139. Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64, 78 (1937).
140. The problem here is not to be confused with that of determining what
is the highest court for purpose of appeal to federal courts as set up under
what was Sec. 25 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 and now Sec. 237, amended, of
the Judicial Code, 43 STAT. 9.7 (1925), 28 U. S. C. § 344 (1934), 45 STAT.
54 (1928), 28 U. S. C. 861a, 861b (Supp. 1939.). However, the cases there de-
cided may prove helpful in reaching a solution to the present problem. See
5 HUGHES, FEDERAL PRACTICE (1931) § 3214 et seq. Cf. supra note 72.
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where the lower courts have spoken, and those where there are either con-
flicting views or no state decisions at all. The federal courts have had
little trouble with the first class of cases, but decisions in the other two
have varied.
It is unnecessary to discuss the great bulk of cases in which there was
authority of the highest court upon which the federal court could rely.
Some few of the cases do present problems worth discussing, however.
For example, the Supreme Court in the previously discussed Wichita
Royalty case,14 1 made some remarks which cast considerable light on the
position to be taken by the federal courts. That case had been before
the Supreme Court of Texas where an opinion was rendered and the
case remanded. After it was remanded, the case was removed to federal
court and carried up to the Supreme Court. Mr. Justice Stone, speaking
for the Court said:
"In departing from the 'law of the case,' as announced by
the state court, and applying a different rule, the court below cor-
rectly stated that by reason of the removal it had been substituted
for the Texas Supreme Court as the appropriate court of appeal
and that it was its duty to apply the Texas law as the Texas court
would have declared and applied it ol a second appeal if the cause
had not been removed. It was the duty of the federal court to
apply the law of Texas -as declared by its highest court. Erie
Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, supra. But the case on the first appeal
had not become res judicata . . . (citations) . . . And
since the Supreme Court of Texas holds itself free upon recon-
sideration to modify or recede from its own opinions, see Quanah,
Acme & Pacific By. Co. v. Wichita State Bank & Tx'jtst Co., 4 '
sitpra, superceding 89 S. IN. (2d) 385, the court below, in apply-
ing the local law, was likewise free to depart from the earlier
rulings to the extent that examination of the later opinions of
the Texas Supreme Court showed that it had modified its opinion
on the first appeal. Hence the only question for our decision is
whether the Court of Appeals rightly concluded that the state
court had thus altered its opinion."a 4 3
The Court went on to find that the state court had not altered its opinion,
but rather had distinguished the two cases. The Court continues in its
opinion:
"Even if -we thought this distinction not well taken, nothing
requires the state courts to adopt the rule which the federal or
other courts may believe to be the better one, or to be consistent
in their decisions if they do not choose to be . . ,4
141. 306 U. S. 103 (1939), supra pp. 6, 11.
142. 127 Tex. 407, 93 S. W. (2d) 701 (1936).
143. Wichita Royalty Co. v. City National Bank, 306 U. S. 103, 107 (1939).
144. Id. at 109. A similar statement appears in First Nat. Bank v. Aetna
(Vol. 5
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It is not for the federal court to question the wisdom of state determina-
tions. It must follow, regardless of its own views as to the correctness of
the law announced by the state court.145
Like the Wichita case, Moore v. Illinois Central R. R.,146 came before
the highest court of the state prior to removal to federal court. The state
court sustained a demurrer by the plaintiff to several of the defendant's
pleas and overruled defendant's demurrer to plaintiff's answer to another
plea. The district court held that the ruling of the Mississippi Supreme
Court on the demurrers had established the law of the case.
Quite often there may be no decision of the highest court which is di-
rectly in point. The District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma
stated that it would accept dictum as being indicative of the views of the
state supreme court. In Shanks v. Travelers' Insurance Co.,"' the court
said:
"The Bean Case,148 supra, probably could have been decided
without the Supreme Court of Oklahoma construing the policy,
but as one of the questions before it was the determining of the
length of time the policy was in force, and as it determined that
the policy was in effect thirty-one days after the termination of
the employment, such a construction is binding upon this
court."'49
Other federal courts have attempted, where there was no state su-
preme court decision directly in point, to find what the attitude of the
state court would be. The Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fourth Cir-
cuit, on a first hearing of American National Insurance Co. v. Belch,"0
found no Virginia ease in point and, therefore, followed the ruling of
the United States Supreme Court on the question. 5 ' On rehearing, the
circuit court found a decision of the Supreme Court of Virginia 5 2 on an
Casualty & Surety Co., 105 F. (2d) 339 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1939), where the court
followed a Pennsylvania rule which is "out of line with the general trend of
the authorities."
145. In his article in 47 YALE L. J. at 1349, supra n. 12, Shulman points out
that this does not mean that the federal courts are deprived of all freedom of
decision. Cf. Worcester County Trust Co. v. Riley, 302 U. S. 292, 299 (1937).
146. 24 F. Supp. 731 (S. D. Miss. 1938).
147. 25 F. Supp. 740 (N. D. Okla. 1938); of. Badger v. Hoidale, 88 F. (2d)
208 (C. C. A. 8th, 1937), Note 109 A. L. R. 805 (1937); cf. also this statement
from Buder v. New York Trust Co., 107 F. (2d) 705 (C. C. A. 2d, 1939),
"Dicta by a trial court justice . . . are not an authoritative declaration of
the state law."
148. Bean v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 164 Okla. 135, 23 P. (2d) 216 (1933).
149. 25 F. Supp. at 743.
150. 100 F. (2d) 48 (C. C. A. 4th, 1938).
151. Landress v. Phoenix Mutual Life Ins. Co., 291 U. S. 491 (1934).
152. Ocean Accident & Guarantee Corp. v. Glover, 165 Va. 283, 182 S. E.
221 (1935).
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allied point, in which the Virginia court discussed favorably an opihion
written by 'Mr. Justice Cardozo while a member of tlie New York Court
of Appeals.'15  In the New York case he expressed the same views given
in his dissent to the United States Supreme Court decision whih had bwen
relied on by the circuit court of appeals at the first hearing. On the basis
of this favorable discussion of the New York case, the court decided that
Virginia would not follow the United States Supreme Court and, therefore,
withdrew its previous opinion. A similar method was used by the Ninth
Circuit in Jensen v- Canadian Indemnity Co.,1 54 when it determined the
law of California by reference to those cases from other jurisdictions,
which the California Supreme Court, in a relevant case, had discussed
with approval or disapproval.
In general it can be said that where the highest court of the state has
spoken, the federal courts have taken the position of a state court and
have proceeded to find the state law just as any &rate court would do it.",,
Of course, there is always the possibility that some controlling decision
may be overlooked. That, however, is a possibility which may easily be
eliminated by proper preparation by counsel. A more real difficulty is
that the federal judges will give only lip service to the rule of the
Tompkins case and, while purporting to follow state decisions, will exer-
cise an independent judgment.156
If counsel and court are unable to find any relevant state decisions,
the federal court must of necessity exercise an independent judgment.1 5 7
153. Lewis v. Ocean Accident & Guarantee Corp., 224 N. Y. 18, 120 N. E. 56
(1918).
154. 98 F. (2d) 469 (C. C. A. 9th, 1938).
155. For examples of how the federal courts proceed to find the state law,
discussing both opinions of courts of last resort and intermediate courts, see
Penn Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Forcier, 103 F. (2d) 166 (C. C. A. 8th, 1939);
American Brake Shoe & Foundry Co. v. Interborough Rapid Transit Co., 26
F. Supp. 954 (S. D. N. Y. 1939).
156. This is a matter which it is extremely difficult to put one's finger on.
It cannot be definitely said that there have been any cases as yet in which
the courts have done so.
This too may be checked somewhat by counsel through exercise of the
right to appeal.
157. The attitude of the courts where no attempt is made by counsel to
to show that the state law differs from the general law is shown in the following
footnote to the opinion in Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U. S. 111
(1938). The court proceeds to apply its own rule after stating, "The federal
jurisdiction rests on diversity of citizenship-National Biscuit Company being
a New Jersey corporation and Kellogg Company a Delaware corporation. Most
of the issues in the case involve questions of common law and hence are within
the scope of Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64 (1938). But no claim has
been made that the local law is any different from the general law on the sub-
ject, and both parties have relied almost entirely on federal precedents."
(Vol. 5
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The Circuit Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, on hearing a case
remanded to it by the Supreme Court, " " said:
"Since it appears that the precise question presented has
never been presented to the Missouri Courts, we have no ehoice
but to consider the question as we previously considered it, ex-
ercising an independent judgment with respect to the issues pre-
sented.""'0
Similar statements -have been made by the Circuit Courts of Appeals
for the First,16 0 Eighth,16' and Ninth Circuits."' The District Court for
the Western District of Pennsylvania stated that in the absence of a
ruling by an Ohio court it would accept, as an authoritative statement
of the law of Ohio, a ruling by the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit in a case arising from the Northern District of Ohio, Eastern
Division.
1 6 3
The real problem in determining what is state law comes when
the only decisions on the precise point in issue are those of the lower
courts. As yet the Supreme Court has said nothing which can be used
as a guide when there are no decisions of the highest court. However,
there is now pending before the court a motion for certiorari in a case
which raises the problem. In West v. American Telephone & Telegraph
Co.,1" the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit refused to
treat a decision of the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County as stating
the law of Ohio. The reason given was that the decision was not binding
on any of the other courts of appeals within the state. By reason of the
circuit court of appeals decision a conflict in the circuits is presented.
158. New York Life In:,. Co. v. Jackson, 304 U. S. 261 (1938).
159. New York Life Ins. Co. v. Jackson, 98 F. (2d) 950, 952 (C. C. A. 7th,
1938). In a later case when no state decision in point was found the court
proceeded to make its own determination. Paddleford v. Fidelity & Casualty
Co., 100 F. (2d) 606 (C. C. A. 7th, 1938).
16.0. Malloy v. New York Life Ins. Co., 103 F. (2d) 439 (C. C. A. 1st, 1939).
161. Mutual Benefit, Health & Accident Ass'n v. Bowman, 99 F. (2d) 856
(C. C. A. 8th, 1938).
162. Hagan & Cushing Co. v. Washington Wat~er Power Co., 99 F. (2d)
614 (C. C. A. 9th, 1938).
163. New York Life Ins. Co. v. Ruhlin, 25 F. Supp. 65, 6"J (W. D. Pa. 1938).
For other examples of how the federal courts reach their decision when no state
decisions are in point see also: Rachlin v. Libby-Owens-Ford Glass Co., 96
F. (2d) 597 (C. C. A. 2d, 1938); Fireman's Fund Indemnity Co. v. Kennedy, 97
F. (2d) 882 (C. C. A. 9th, 1938); Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Plymouth Box
& Panel Co., 99 F. (2d) 218 (C. C. A. 4th, 1938); New England Mutual Life
Ins. Co. v. Spence, 25 F. Supp. 633 (W. D. N. Y. 1938); Toomey v. Toomey, 98
F. (2d) 736 (C. C. A. 7th, 1938).
164. 108 F. (2d) 347 (C. C. A. 6th, 1939); cf. Field v. Fidelity Union Trust
Co., 108 F. (2d) 521 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1939) (lower court interpretation of state
statute); Buder v. New York Trust Co., 107 F. (2d) 705 (C. C. A. 2d, 1939);
Hedrick v. Canadian Pacific Ry., 28 F. Supp. 257 (S. D. Ohio 1939). 33
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Previously the Circuit Court of Appeals for the ,Seventh Circuit had
said that it would accept, as authoritative, appellate court cases if they
were not in conflict and were not modified or overruled by later decisions,
either of the supreme court or of an intermediate court. "", The District
Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania had taken all equally strong
stand. In New York Life Insurance Co. v. RJhlin,"' the latter .ourt said:
The Kramer Case," 7 as a decision of Pennsylvania,
is binding on this court, even though it may have been by an
intermediate court of appeals. See Blair v. Commissioner of
Internal Revenue, 300 U. S. 5, 10, 57 S. Ct. 330, 332, 81 L. Ed.465.,"168
Other courts had applied intermediate court decisions and treated them as
though controlling without any discussion of the fact that they were so
doing.'"9
On the other hand, the Eighth Circuit had taken a less firm stand.
After citing a number of state cases on the point in issue the court said:
All of these cases are Courts of Appeals cases and
not in the Supreme Court of Missouri. Therefore, they cannot
be finally accepted as stating the law of the State of Missouri.
However. they are strongly persuasive."'7 0
The court went on to point out that federal precedents would bring the
same result.
In the cases thus far discussed an attempt has been made to note,
through consideration of the expansion and application of the Tonmpkins
case, the changes brought and the problems raised by it. As might be
expected of a ease which has been given so much publicity, it is frequently
cited in places where state law has always governed. For example, in
suits in which removability to federal courts is contested on the grounds
165. Hack v. American Surety Co., 96 F. (2d) 939 (C. C. A. 7th, 1938),
cert. denied, 305 U. S. 631 (1938); American Optometric Ass'n v. Ritholh, 101
F. (2d) 883 (C. C. A. 7th, 1939); Mangol v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 103 F.(2d) 14 (C. C. A. 7th, 1939).
166. 25 F. Supp. 65 (W. D. Pa. 1938), aff'd, 106 F. (2d) 921 (C. C. A. 3rd,1939). The circuit court of appeals cites only Pennsylvania Supreme Court
cases.
167. Kramer v. Mutual-Life Ins. Co., 130 Pa. Super. 85 (1938).
168. 25 F. Supp. at 69. The Blair case relied on by the court here is not
as strong as the statement for which it is given as authority. That case involved
an interpretation by a state appellate court of the very trust agreement under
consideration in the suit in federal court. A statement similar to that quoted,
though without mention of the Blair case, appears in Delaware & H. R. Corp.
v. Bonzik, 105 F. (2d) 341 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1939).
169. Sunkist Drinks v. California Fruit Growers Exchange, 25 F. Supp.
400 (S. D. N. Y. 1938); Mau v. Rio Grande Oil, 28 F. Supp. 845 (N. D. Calif.
1939).
170. Turner v. New York Life Ins. Co., 100 F. (2d) 193, 194 (C. C. A. 8th,
1938. Rehearing denied Dec. 28, 1938).
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that the controversy is not "wholly between citizens of different States, 1"17
the Tompkins case has been cited as supporting the proposition that state
decisions must be consulted to determine whether the controversy is a
separable one. 17 2  Of course, to the extent that "separability" depends
upon several rather than joint liability the case does support such a prop-
osition and it is strictly in accord with its spirit and policy to apply state
decisions in this situation. However, its effect is merely cumulative, since
even before the Tompkins case state decisions were held to be controlling
in determining whether an action brought against a citizen and a non-citi-
zen of a state was joint so as to defeat diversity jurisdiction. 17
The Tompkins case is also frequently cited as authority for the propo-
sition that state statutes, and decisions interpreting those statutes, must
be followed by federal courts in cases not governed by the Constitution,
treaties or statutes of the United States.'7  Prior to the Tompkins case it
was the general rule that state interpretation of statutes would be followed
in federal court.'7 ' However, there were certain exceptions to the general
rule and on these exceptions the Tompkins case will have some effect.
In Norfolk " IT. Ry. t. Riggs,',- the problem was not one of statutory
171. 36 STAT. 1094 (1911), 28 U. S. C. § 71 (1934).
172. Ervin v. Texas Co., 97 F. (2d) 806 (C. C. A. 8th, 1938); Phillips v.
Davidson, 24 F. Supp. 184 (E. D. S. C. 1938); Jensen v. Safeway Stores, 24F. Supp. 585 (D. Mont. 1938); Lawley v. Whiteis, 24 F. Supp. 698 (N. D.
Okla. 1938).
173. Cincinnati, New Orleans & Texas Pacific Ry. v. Bohon, 200 U. S. 221(1906); McFarland v. Goodrich Rubber Co., 47 F. (2d) 44 (C. C. A. 8th, 1931),
and cases there cited; Norwalk v. Air-Way Electric Appliance Corp., 87 F.(2d) 317 (C. C. A. 2d, 1937). Notes (1936) 36 COL. L. REV. 794, (1937) 110A. L. R. 188, 191, (1939) 25 VA. L. REV. 492. However, in Pullman Co. v.Jenkins, 305 U. S. 534 (19'.9), the Supreme Court apparently made its owndetermination as to whether a joint action was alleged. It is difficult to explain
this seeming departure from the earlier line of decisions and from the spirit of
the Tompkins case. Mr. Justice Black in a concurring opinion protested against
the basis of the majority opinion. His only mention of the Tompkins case is in
a footnote reference to Ervin v. Texas Co., supra note 172.
174. Norfolk & W. Ry. v. Riggs, 98 F. (2d) 612 (C. C. A. 6th, 1938);
Perkins v. United States ex rel. Malesevic, 99 F. (2d) 255 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1938) ;
Paul v. Craemer, 24 F. Supp. 353 (S. D. Calif. 1938); Futrell v. Branson, 104
F. (2d) 409 (C. C. A. 8th, 1939); In re Wiegand, 27 F. Supp. 725 (S. D. Calif.
1939); Rorick v. Board of Commissioners of Evergladfs Drainage District, 24
F. Supp. 458 (N. D. Fla. 1938); Rodgers v. Mabelvale Extension Road Improve-
ment Dist., 103 F. (2d) 844 (C. C. A. 8th, 1939); Dolcater v. Manufacturers &
Traders Trust Co., 25 F. Supp. 637 (W. D. N. Y. 1938), appeal dismissed, 106
F. (2d) 30 (C. C. A. 2d, 1939). In St. Louis v. Mississippi River Fuel Corp.,
97 F. (2d) 726 (C. C. A. 8th, 1938), the Tompkins case was given as authority
for the determination that Missouri decisions should govern the interpretation
of a Missouri tax statute. Cf. Bacon & Sons v. Martin, 305 U. S. 380 (1939),
and cases there cited.
175. For discussions of this proposition see Fordham, Swift v. Tyson and
the Construction of State Statutes (1935) 41 W. VA. L. Q. 131, Notes (1927)
5 TEX. L. REv. 191, (1934) 48 HARV. L. REV. 132, (1936) 14 TEx. L. REv. 391.
176. 98 F. (2d) 612 (C. C. A. 6th, 1938). This is the only case since the
Tompkins case which would not have come under the previous general rule. 35
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interpretation, but whether the particular statute itself' was applicable to
suits in federal court. The statute in question provided that in suits
against a railroad for injury to an employee, "all question of negligence
and contributory negligence shall be for the jury.' '" 7  This statute had
previously been held inapplicable to suits in federal court, ' "- but in the
Riggs case the court held that on the basis of the Tompkins ease it should
be applied .1 7  The case indicates that the exceptions lo tle rule that
state statutes and interpretations of those statutes are binding of federal
courts will be eliminated by the Tompkins case unless they canl be justified
as procedural or on some such basis.
To summarize briefly, the Tompkins case has had important expansions
in two directions. It has been expanded to cover cases in equity, as well
as in law, and to cover other than diversity of citizenship cases. Both
of these expansions seem quite justifiable because the basis of jurisdiction,
or the mamer in which relief is sought, should not determine the rules of
decision to be applied. Both expansions have been sanctioned by the
Supreme Court. The former is perhaps of less importance than it would
have been had not the Rules of Civil Procedure brought about the union
of law and equity. The latter is of tremendous importance, but, as yet, there
have not been enough cases to tell just.how far the expansion to nion-diver-
sity-cases will be carried. There are indications, however, that it may
have far-reaching effects, particularly in the fields of banking and taxa-
tion.
The extent of the doctrine's effect in non-diversity cases is somewhat
dependent on where the line is drawn between federal and non-federal
questions. This distinction is itself one of the most difficult problems left
by the Tomnpkins case. In its solution, however, the courts will not be
given such latitude that the Swift v. Tyson problem of general and local
law will be revived. As yet there has been little done toward drawing the
line between federal and non-federal questions.
Another of the limits of the doctrine of Erie Railroad v. Tompkins
has been placed at the point where substance and procedure meet. The
location of that point should be determined in accordance with the policy
of the Tompkins case to promote conformity of result within each state.
177. 99 Ohio Laws 25, § 2 (1908), Throckmorton's Ohio General Code, §
9018 (1936).
178. Nash v. Pennsylvania R. R., 60 F. (2d) 26 (C. C. A. 6th, 1932), cf.
Herron v. Southern Pacific Co., 283 U. S. 91 (1931).
179. Norfolk & W. Ry. v. Riggs, 98 F. (2d) 612 (C. C. A. 6th, 1938).
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For the most part substance has been defined broadly in accordance with
that policy.
Determination of what law shall govern choice of law question and of
what is state law will also help set the boundaries of the Tompkins doctrine.
Although it seems clear that choice of law rules are a part of the substan-
tive law of the state which should be followed by the federal courts, that
problem is still unanswered. The problem of what is state law is also in
part unanswered. Decisions of the highest court are clearly binding, but
the status of appellate and lower court opinions is still in doubt.
Although for the most part the courts have recognized the problems'8 0
and attempted to solve them as they arose, in the period of nearly two
years since the decisions they have been able to do little more than set the
broad outlines of the doctrine and suggest some of the problems yet to be
decided. It will be years before the problems will be solved and the full
effect of Erie Railroad v. Tompkins can be known.
180. However compare this statement of Gardner, J., in Thompson v.
Louisiana, 98 F. (2d) 108 (C. C. A. 8th, 1938), "Congress, of course, has no
power to enact a state taxing measure. Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins . .(citation) . . . Lowden v. State Corp. Comm., 42 N. M. 254."
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